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© 2014 Nicholas Godlove, J.D. *

Introduction: Will Bitcoins Become a New Global Currency?
Probably not.
Whether due to their apparent ease in facilitating money laundering and
procuring illegal substances without involving established financial
institutions, or merely because they have received a lot of press lately,
Bitcoins 1 have increasingly come under scrutiny by the regulatory agencies
of various state, federal and international governments. 2 In all statements so
far, these regulatory bodies have been intentionally vague and speculative
regarding how and when such enforcement would take place.3 Several
tremulous steps taken by committees on the nascent technology have been
characterized by fundamental misconceptions as to the nature of virtual
currency. 4 The questions that have been left unanswered include: Is there a
purpose to be served in such regulation? And, how would such regulation
be conducted? This article seeks to provide preliminary answers to those
questions, and to posit a framework for considering virtual currency in a
regulatory framework that will grow as the incipient technology develops.
* Faculty Associate, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State
University, Phoenix, Ariz. Previously law clerk for the Hon. Judge H. Russell Holland,
Federal District of Alaska. I would like to thank my mentor Professor Joel Dobris at the
University of California, Davis, my family, and Douglas Rennie for their assistance in the
writing of this article.
1. “Bitcoins” in this article will be used to refer to the Bitcoin network and concept
exclusively; “bitcoins” refers to an actual unit of the Bitcoin exchange; “Coins” (with a
capital “C”) refers to Bitcoins and its derivative virtual currency, including Dogecoins,
Flexcoins, etc. When I refer to Bitcoins, I mean the specific algorithms and processes by
which this virtual currency is used. When I refer to the concept in general, I will use the
more generic phrase “virtual currency,” although some in the tech community use the
expression “digital currency” to denote the same concept.
2. New York State Currency Regulatory Board, California Attorney General’s Office,
Japanese Federal Government.
3. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, Guidance: Application
of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual
Currencies, FINCEN (No. FIN-2013-G001, Mar. 18, 2013), http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/
guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Guidance FIN-2013-G001].
4. See e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n, Draft Advisory Opinion 2013-15 (Conservative
Action Fund) (Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/201315.pdf.
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This article will begin with an overview of the most successful virtual
currency created to date –Bitcoin- and explain its progeny: virtual currency
created by substantially duplicating the coding and ideas of the Bitcoin.
From there, the article will describe how virtual currency abuts current
regulatory law, and how it may develop in the future. Finally, I will propose
framework for a regulatory environment that will regulate virtual currency
in its current form and continue to serve future developments.
Bitcoin is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for the exchange of
unique serial numbers. Possession of these numbers is exclusive to the
owner of the Coin, owned by them in an encrypted file. Bitcoins allow for
secure transfer of ownership without the need for a trusted third party. The
unit of the network is bitcoin, or BTC, which has been alternatively argued
to be a currency, commodity, or method of exchange. The Bitcoin network
launched in 2009 after years of development by Satoshi Nakamoto, an
individual or group whose identity is still debated. 5
The network began with the publication of a mathematical proof which
spurred “miners” to use software programs that follow the mathematical
formula to produce bitcoins. The formula and software are freely available
for anyone to use. There is a finite amount of bitcoins that may be produced
and as more bitcoins are created, the mathematical computations required to
create more become increasingly difficult. Bitcoins can be traded or used to
buy goods and services. All bitcoin transactions are recorded in the “block
chain” - a massive and transparent ledger of each and every bitcoin
transaction maintained by the miners. There is no central authority that
oversees Bitcoin.
Background: Virtual Currency in General
I. How Virtual Currency Differs from Traditional Money Transmission
A. Current E-Transmission of Money
1. Electronic Funds Transfers
Electronic funds transfers (“EFTs”) have been established and common
since the 1980s, and they have become an inextricable part of the global
economy. Virtual currency is distinct from previous electronic funds
transfers by the elimination of a heretofore-unthinkable step: No dollars are
5. A man who has been living under the name Satoshi Nakamoto for decades has been
identified in Northern California, but whether he is the developer in whole or in part remains
an open question.
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ever routed through centralized financial organizations. This distinction
leads to several radical departures between the regulatory outcome of the
two methods, and an understanding of the current enforcement regime is
necessary in order to understand what changes must occur if the system can
apply to virtual currency.
Article 4A of the UCC, promulgated by the ALI and National
Conference, enacted in all fifty states and endorsed by the Fed,6 forms the
backbone of large money payments from one business or financial
institution to another though electronic means.7 The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act governs point-of-sale transactions in which retail customers
pay for purchases by use of an access or debit card at a retail store, ATM
transactions; direct deposit; and preauthorization withdrawals.8 Wire
transfers (typically in small amounts) are covered under money
transmission laws by the states but not governed by Article 4A.
EFTs necessarily involve a bank account in the transferor’s country, and
a separate account in the transferee’s country. Each bank must conduct
itself according to local laws, and the transfers thus fall into several
enforcement regimes. 9 For example, a business in California buying
widgets in China must send the payment from their California bank, which
implicates California banking and business codes, federal banking secrecy
acts, and federal money laundering regimes. Once the money reaches a
bank in China with an agreement with the California bank, it must place the
money in the correct account in accordance with Chinese banking law. This
is the simplest possible example, but even this simple transfer precipitates
substantial legislative oversight, without much protecting the beneficiary. 10

6. U.C.C. art. 4A (amended 2012).
7. Id..
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (2012).
9. U.C.C. § 4A-302.
10. Mark Sneddon, The Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on the Law of
International Credit Transfers, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1996), available at http://digital
commons.lmu.edu/llr/vol29/iss3/11.

4

10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 70 (2014)

[Vol. 10

Seller

Buyer

Seller's Bank

Buyer's Bank

5. Ownership
Transferred
for Present
Value to
Seller's Bank
and Credited
to Seller

4. Payment
Order
Transfer
through
Intermediate
Parties

Fig 1: Traditional Electronic Funds Transfer
How are millions of dollars transferred from New York to California in a
few hours? Perhaps a “Two bank transfer” occurs, which is actually two
payment orders: first, from the Buyer to their bank, and second, from the
buyer’s bank to the beneficiary’s bank. 11 Usually in these cases, the banks
have settlement agreements through “cross accounts” or a “common
account” which they have agreed on prior to this exchange. Another manner
of large money transfer is a “CHIPS” transfer, if both the originator’s’ and
beneficiary’s’ banks are participants in the Clearing House Interbank
Payments System of the New York Clearing House Association. Or, if the
banks have accounts in privity with the Fed, they may use Fedwire to settle
their accounts.
A funds transfer involves a series of payment orders, defined in 4A103(a)(1) as “an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank . . . to pay, or
cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a
beneficiary ***.” As a result of “acceptance” of a payment order, the rights
and obligations of the participants is defined under Article 4A. 12
Acceptance obligates the receiving bank to execute a payment order by
sending it to a receiving bank, and itself becoming a sender. 13 Eventually
11. EARNEST T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR. & RAJ K. BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS
140 (1993)
12. U.C.C. § 4A-209.
13. Id. § 4A-209(a), 302(a)(1), 402(c).
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the final receiving bank, the beneficiary’s bank, receives the payment order
and becomes liable for the amount of the payment order to the
beneficiary. 14 Speed of processing takes precedence over assignment of
liability. Payment orders under 4A are not intended to require banks to
engage in inquiries as to whether conditions have been satisfied, and banks
act essentially as functionaries. 15 Banks that accept the payment order must
ensure that they send it, which makes the wholesale money wire transfer
system cheap, speedy, and final. Summary judgments are permitted on
Article 4A. 16
Funds transfers are very efficient for moving large amounts of money.
Fraudulent payment orders are therefore a concern. Fraudulently executed
orders may cause a chain of banks to transfer payment orders to an account
controlled by the thief in another bank. Under 4A a receiving bank that
executes a payment order is not acting as an agent of the sender. 17 But the
agency doctrines of actual, implied, and apparent authority are difficult to
apply to these larger, more impersonal functionary transactions. In the
funds transfer realm, the key concept is whether such payments were
“authorized,” albeit in a different context than authority as exists in agency
law. Thus, in order to facilitate banks’ willingness to transfer millions,
billions, and trillions of dollars quickly all over the world, banks that
execute payments that “test” can send the order without fear of liability. 18
So long as the banks use a security procedure that is commercially
reasonable and the receiving bank proves that it accepted the order in good
faith after verifying the order in compliance with that security procedure,
the payment order is effective, whether or not the customer actually
authorized it. 19 Thus, customers accept most of the risk of loss, although
banks have the burden or ensuring that they use reasonable security
procedures.
2. Credit Card Payments
Credit card payments are the most useful methods for payments made by
consumers in smaller dollar amounts. The transfers are surprisingly
similarly unsecure as electronic funds transfers. Indeed, little has changed
14. Id. § 4A-404(a).
15. Centre-Point Merchant Bank v. Am. Express Bank, 913 F. Supp. 202, 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
16. Aleo Intl., Ltd. v. Citibank, 612 N.Y.S.2d 540 (S. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 1994).
17. U.C.C. § 4A-212.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 4A-203.
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in the actual technology of transferring funds from the 1980s framework.
Other than bouncing the signals off a satellite instead of through sea cables,
US systems still use the relatively unsecure format-preserving 58k
encryption of credit card information in terminal-to-terminal sales, while
only purchases over the Internet use the more secure 128-bit pseudorandom hexadecimal encryption but lack authentication features.
“Universal” credit cards issued by financial institutions provide
unsecured short-term credit to cardholders to permit them to purchase from
a universe of merchants and sellers that are not associated with the card.
The merchant or seller is faced with several risks in honoring a credit card.
First, the person may not be authorized to use the card, and the credit line
that looks legitimate may not be paid through. Second, the issuer may have
revoked the card. Third, the amount of credit given by the issuer to the
cardholder may not be sufficient to cover the amount of the purchase.
Usually, however, the risk for some or all of the purchase is taken by the
issuer, which charges a fee to compensate for the risk. Fees to the merchant
for receiving a payment through the issuer are called the “interchange fee,”
and generally average about 1.5% of the sales price.
Cardholders enjoy dramatically limited statutory liability to charges not
in excess of $50, if the issuer has given adequate notice of the potential
liability and provided a method whereby the user can be identified as the
authorized user for unauthorized use of their cards. 20 “Unauthorized Use”
means a use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does
not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which
the cardholder receives no benefit.21 Apparent authority is the most
commonly litigated situation; as apparent authority for use may arise
through a cardholder’s negligence.22
States have also hotly debated the consumer protections inherent in
credit cards since their origins in the 1960s, such as the extent to which
consumers may chargeback their payments if goods are delivered in a
defective state or never delivered. The 1974 Fair Credit Billing Act, now
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 23 regulates the rights between
cardholders and card issuers. These provisions allow issuers to make
agreements governing relationships with merchants, merchant banks, and
issuing banks, allowing limited recourse and chargeback in the case of a
20.
21.
22.
1996).
23.

15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2012).
Id. § 1602.
Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 98 F.3d 703 (2d Cir.
15 U.S.C. § 1666.
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dispute. 24 However, there are geographic limitations on the cardholder’s use
of defenses to payment against the issuer.
3. Current Payment Process on the Internet
Most Internet sales are currently paid for by credit cards, which are
leading to increasing losses as security problems mount. Typical online
sales are considered “card-not-present” transactions as opposed to face-toface sales, where brick-and-mortar stores may verify the identity of the
cardholder. Internet sales leave the merchant liable for the loss.25 More
Internet transactions are charged back than retail transactions and stolen
credit card numbers can be easily used to make purchases.26 Credit card
numbers are easily stolen and sold, each stolen credit card being worth
approximately $25 on the international black market. The hacker who stole
millions of credit card numbers from Target made several million dollars
selling them on the Internet.
Already several obvious reasons emerge for preferring a virtual currency,
which lead to several non-obvious reasons that signal a real reason for the
global transactional market to make a shift. Before computers became
ubiquitous, the fundamental organization of business monetary transfer was
largely the same as today. Inventory, price lists, payroll, accounts
receivable all recorded on a ledger or series of ledgers. American law and
accounting rules mean every business must know exactly what its current
prices are, inventory, shipping, accounts receivable, payable and a
multitude of other factors. Computers built specifically for calculating these
business transactions can now read in large amounts of data and apply
operations to that data. These mainframes manage gargantuan amounts of
data and process transactions continually. Today, a large portion of
operations are done in-memory, as opposed to punch-cards and reel-to-reel
tape, but businesses operate in the same fundamental way because in order
to have transactional integrity, everything has to be checked against and
applied to the ledger. Everything must eventually be tallied in a centralized
system prevent double-booking or double-spending. 27

24. Id. §1666i.
25. Thomas E. Weber, What Do You Risk Using a Credit Card to Shop on the Net,
WALL. ST. J., Dec. 10, 2001, at B1.
26. Julia Angwin, Credit-Card Scams Bedevil E-Stores, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 19, 2000, at
B1.
27. Cf. Joshua A. Kroll, Ian C. Davey & Edwward W. Felten, The Economics of Bitcoin
Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries (paper delivered at the Twelfth Workshop on
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In the same fashion, credit cards run similar ledgers, except a card’s
balance is applied to an individual or organization’s personal credit
account. After locking the account to prevent tampering with transmissions,
the card issuer will inspect the transaction for signs of fraud, deduct money
from the customer’s balance and credit the merchant, take fees, and the
ledger will have the transaction recorded, then unlocked, which will send a
return signal to the merchant that the transaction was successful. Because it
is centralized to a single point of authority, the entire process takes only a
few milliseconds. The complexity of computers, network, and engineering
involved in this system is tremendous.
B. How Virtual Currency Works on a Technical Level
1. The Bitcoin’s Block-Chain
Surprising to those who think of Bitcoins as anonymous currency, virtual
currency is inextricably linked with a public ledger of transfer.28 In fact, the
very foundation of the Bitcoin’s existence is bound with a public record of
every exchange of every coin between transferors and transferees,
published to all other users on the network, forming a chain that can be
tracked the creation of the currency. 29 This list of all transfers, going back
to the “Genesis Block” of original Bitcoins, is called the “Block chain.” 30
2. The Bitcoin Transfer Process
Bitcoin is essentially a unique serial number that gets hashed31 using
public-key cryptography whenever an owner wants to send a payment to a
transferee. The transferor has a ledger indicating their ownership of a
certain Bitcoin, which they have in their turn received via a series of
transfers from the original Genesis block, each transfer of which is recorded
and hashed again. Once the transferor declares they want to make a
payment, they encrypt their owned serial number and announce to whom
they want to make a transfer. 32 The public announcement is secure because
all the vital information is encrypted, including the verification of the serial
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2013), Washington, D.C., June 11-12, 2013),
available at http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf.
28. There are virtual currencies that do not use public ledgers in existence but they are
not highly utilized and do not meet the definition of currency for this article.
29. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2009),
available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Encrypted, in the most generic sense.
32. NAKAMOTO, supra note 29.
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number. The ingenious trick is that the verification is done by the public
and discoverable, as computers on the network figure out what nonce 33 has
been used with the public key. Other computers on the network, unrelated
to the transaction, can verify the transfer by finding the nonce, which is
relatively easy to discover within a few minutes by brute-forcing
algorithms. By doing so, the transfer is verified as legitimate and at the
same time a record of the transfer is made and distributed to the network,
although the identities of the transferor and transferee are still encrypted
and, theoretically, unknowable.34 This means that all transferees of Bitcoins
are on the public ledger, although their identities are encrypted. The block
chain of Bitcoin owners has grown to 25 GB as of today.

Genesis Block

Initial Transfer

Subsequent
Transfer
Attempted
Second
Transfer (Not
Verified)

Subsequent
Transfer
(Verified)
Attempted
Transfer (Not
verified)

Additional
Verified
Transfers (ad
infinitum)
Further attempts to
transfer fail

Fig 2: Hash Chain
Where do Bitcoin serial numbers come from? Actually, there are no
stable serial numbers that correspond to any particular bitcoin. Transaction
hashes fulfill the role of the serial number. In any transaction, the transferee
receives a unique hash of their public key and the transferor’s bitcoin serial
number, which in turn was the output of an earlier transaction. Each transfer
hashes the old serial number into a new one, which can only be transferred
by the new owner. 35
There are two implications to Bitcoin’s use of transaction hashes instead
of serial numbers. First, Bitcoins are not separate, persistent “coins” of
unique serial numbers, rather each Bitcoin is better thought of as a series of
transactions that show up in the block chain. The second, and more
important result of operating in this way is that it obviates the need for any
central authority to issue or verify the serial numbers. 36 Instead, the serial
numbers are self-generated, merely by hashing previous numbers from prior
transactions.
33. Permutation of the public key.
34. NAKAMOTO, supra note 29.
35. This owes to the unique nature of public-key cryptography. The details of how this
works are incredibly innovative, but beyond the scope of this article. See id.
36. Id.
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In fact, it’s possible to keep following the chain of transactions further
back in history than just the previous transfer. Ultimately, this process must
terminate. The chain of transfers can be followed back to one of two
originating transactions. The first possibility is that the ledger tracks back to
the first Bitcoin transaction, contained in the so-called Genesis block, the
original bitcoins. This is a special transaction, having no inputs, but a 50
bitcoin output. In other words, this transaction established the initial money
supply. 37 The Genesis block is treated separately by Bitcoin clients, and
although the details can be more complex than the standard transaction, we
can think about these transfers in a similar fashion to subsequent
transactions described above. The important thing to remember is just that
anyone can create a Genesis block of a Bitcoin-like virtual currency by
making an initial transaction. 38 From there, subsequent transfers can be
made by the initial transferees to anybody.
The second (and more likely) possibility would be to track the coin back
to a “coinbase transaction.” Except for the Genesis block, every block of
transactions in the block chain starts with a special coinbase transaction.
Coinbase transactions are created to reward the third party miners who
confirm others’ transactions. They are designed to reward that miner for
validating that block of transactions. The hash uses a similar but not
identical format to the Genesis transaction described above. Coinbase
transactions are rewards to incentivize the other users of the network to
donate their resources verifying transfers between other, anonymous, users.
Unfortunately, they are set to expire after a given period of time or number
of transfers, effectively capping the upper-bound of the given currency,
preventing the creation of new currency in that ledger.39

Intial Coin
Serial
Number

+
XOR

Discoverable
Nonce (What
Miners
Attempt to
Find)

+
XOR

Public Key
Cryptography

New Bitcoin
(Known to
New Owner)

Fig 3: Hash numbers between transfers

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.. In 2024, miners will cease to be compensated for facilitating transfers, and
“mining” will either cease entirely or be done in return for bounties offered by the
transferring parties in return for verification.
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3. What This Means
How anonymous is Bitcoin? Many people claim that Bitcoin can be used
anonymously. This claim has led to the formation of marketplaces such
as the Silk Road (and various successors), which specialize in illegal goods.
However, the claim that Bitcoin is anonymous is a myth.40 The block chain
is public, meaning that it is possible for anyone to see every Bitcoin
transaction ever, back to the Genesis block or coinbase transaction.
Although Bitcoin addresses aren’t immediately associated with real-world
identities, computer scientists have done much work figuring out how to deanonymize “anonymous” social networks. The block chain is a marvelous
target for these techniques. The great majority of Bitcoin users will be
identified with relatively high confidence and ease in the near future.
The confidence interval linking block chain transferees and individuals
will be enough to achieve probable cause for further investigation of
discovered individuals, but not high enough to generate convictions without
more evidence. But law enforcement will soon be able to identify likely
targets whom they suspect of illegally using virtual currency. Furthermore,
identification will be retrospective, meaning that someone who bought
drugs on Silk Road in 2011 will still be identifiable on the basis of the
block chain whenever these techniques are developed. These deanonymization techniques are well known to computer scientists, and
therefore to the NSA, and likely eventually will be used by law
enforcement.
The existence of this public ledger is essential to ensuring that Bitcoins
cannot be double-spent, which means that the ledger is, absent some
currently-unforeseeable technological development, 41 a necessary function
of the currency. The implications of this are nontrivial, and it is vital to
understand that this ledger must exist for secure virtual currency to exist, to
understand how any likely possible regulatory scheme may be
implemented. Any discussion of “virtual currency” that does not include the

40. Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System, in
SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 197 (Yaniv Altshuler et al. eds., 2013),
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6113303&isnumber=
6113084
41. See Patricia Everacre, Isabelle Simplot-Ryl & Issa Traoré, Double Spending
Protection for E-Cash Based on Risk Management, in INFORMATION SECURITY 394 (Mike
Burmester, Gene Tsudik, Spyros Magliveras & Ivana E. Ilić eds., 2011) (Lecture Notes in
Computer Science No. 6531), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_33/.
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public ledger is either misinformed or discussing a technology that cannot
in good faith be called virtual currency. 42
The last significant development in virtual currency is the creation of
various online currency exchanges. 43 These exchanges permit the trading of
actual cash into various cryptocurrencies (which now number over one
hundred), and the exchange of these currencies. An exchange will also take
possession of Coins owned by a customer and hold them in trust. An
exchange can make paper trades on Coins held in trust, offer them for sale,
and (supposedly) hold Coins safely. In theory, virtual currency exchanges
permit buyers, sellers, and speculators to come to a consensus on Coin price
similar to traditional stock and commodity markets. In practice, Bitcoin
exchanges are targets for hackers and thieves, and are often operated
dishonestly and openly operate with security holes amounting to
negligence, 44 while speculators end up eating their hats on uncontrolled
currency losses. 45 Even the Winklevoss twins, who have become famous
for suing Mark Zuckerberg, are venture capitalists attempting to generate
support for their Bitcoin payment processing system. 46 Several more
legitimate currency exchanges have since been created with a focus on
security and efficiency, the most important of which is Coinbase, which has
attracted $25 million in venture capital.47

42. At least, this is the case barring further cryptographic developments.
43. Mt. Gox and Flexcion were two of the largest early adopters, but both have closed
their doors after being hacked. Cryptsy, a U.S.-based exchange, shows the same signs of
mismanagement but is currently still operational. Vircurex, a Chinese exchange, and Kraken,
a UK and U.S. located exchange, are also both operating at the time of this publication.
44. See, e.g., CoinLab, Inc. v. Mt. Gox KK Et Al, No., 2:13-cv-00777 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 4, 2013).
45. Reddit Hat Eat, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://youtu.be/mjiX7xiFD-o/.
46. Colleen Taylor, With $1.5M Led by Winklevoss Capital, BitInstant Aims to Be the GoTo Site to Buy and Sell Bitcoins, TECHCRUNCH.COM (May 17, 2013), available at http://
techcrunch.com/2013/05/17/with-1-5m-led-by-winklevoss-capital-bitinstant-aims-to-be-thego-to-site-to-buy-and-sell-bitcoins/.
47. For information about Coinbase, see ABOUT COINBASE, https://coinbase.com/about/
(last visited July 9, 2014). See also ATLAS [NORTH AMERICA], https://atlasats.com (last
visited July 9, 2014); PERSEUS, http://perseustelecom.com (last visited July 9, 2014).
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II. Use of Virtual Currency Today and Tomorrow
A. What Advantages Do Public Ledger Virtual Currencies Have Over
Single-Point Payments?
1. Cost Advantage
The first and most justifiable reason a virtual currency should exist and
enjoy frequent use is the convenience and safety of such payment methods.
Public ledger payments are inconvenient, but they are inconvenient at a
constant rate. The costs of Bitcoins do not scale upward for large payments
as opposed to small payments, or for international payments as opposed to
local payments. Indeed, the major reasons for Bitcoin adoption involves
harmless, if nerdy, hobby trading. Small-scale sales of durable goods
(hobby collectibles which I will consider a kind of commodity) is not
economical when factoring in exchange rates and international payment
fees. Virtual currency somewhat mitigates these problems.
Additional problems with long-distance sales include international
escrow in the age of the internet: a stable international payment system
would make international purchasing, labor and regulatory costs much
easier to minimize by globally sourcing the cheapest location regardless of
local currency. In fact, it is conceivable that with large-scale trading hubs,
international currency arbitrage will become radically altered in the future.
Bitcoin is the first invention of a method of transfer between unknown
parties without needing recourse to a trusted third party.
For example, Bitcoin or other digital currencies might enable individuals
to transfer money as seamlessly as sending an email, while reducing money
transfer and currency conversion fees. Payments between unknown parties
can take place without regard to which countries those parties live in. This
is a significant step forward for the global market.
Businesses may use Bitcoins to accept non-cash payments for the same
percentage fee regardless of purchase amount ($5M or $0.05). Again, this
makes virtual currency much more lucrative for business-owners seeking a
global market, and allows competitive advantage on the global stage
without international barriers to transaction caused by the use of
intermediaries such as banks or credit card companies. As payment costs
scale upward, international money transferors charge fees that begin to
outgrow profits, like tariffs reducing the efficiency of the global market.
Travelers may conceivably buy goods abroad without paying crossborder fees typically charged by banks. However, it is important to note that
the future could look different as rising regulatory and operating costs for
Bitcoin and potentially falling costs for the conventional players as they are
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forced to compete could narrow the cost savings in using virtual currency.
Just as a flurry of new entrants – such as Square, Groupon, and PayPal encouraged payment networks and payment processors to develop a mobile
payments strategy, traditional payment players will likely develop virtual
currency strategies.
Currently, consumers pay a money transfer fee as a percentage of the
total amount transferred: approximately 10% on average. Money transfer
networks, such as Western Union, charge these fees for accessing their
network, as well as to cover agent commissions and foreign exchange
conversion fees. Today, Bitcoin could theoretically reduce these fees to 1%
by bypassing traditional money transfer systems and instead enabling
transfers directly between two Bitcoin wallets. As a result, annual net
savings for consumers could theoretically amount to over $43 billion based
on the World Bank’s estimate of global money transfers.48 But any savings
in this context usually involves at least one of the parties being unbanked,
which would make converting bitcoin into local currency very difficult.
And in countries where access to a bank, or conversion of foreign currency
has been limited, virtual currency is likely to face similar challenges. 49 The
tight control China has taken to devalue the Yuan has led it to become the
first nation to outlaw banks from trading in Bitcoin. This makes conversion
of Yuan into Bitcoin much more difficult than simply using a traditional
payment method.
Clearly, the biggest hurdle to widespread adoption of virtual currency
would be maintaining its cost-advantage over traditional payment methods.
In fact, as we consider the regulatory structure of virtual currency, we will
either see any development stymied by over-reaching regulation, or we
must create a regulatory system that fosters this development by
maintaining its competitive edge over traditional payment schemes.
The use of virtual currency will only grow if it can maintain its costadvantage over traditional payment methods. The most likely area where
virtual currencies can maintain this advantage is through global product
sourcing. Thus, the value of virtual currency can be computed:

48. Roman Leal, Is Bitcoin the Future of Payments?, TOP OF MIND (Goldman Sachs
Global Investment Research Paper), Mar. 11, 2014, Issue 21, at 18.
49. Id.
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Fig. 4: Calculating the Real Value of a Bitcoin50
2. Ease of Use in Illegal or Sensitive Transactions
A second, and less justifiable reason for use of virtual currency, but one
that has led to a large part of its adoption, is the avoidance of banking
regulations and laws. Bank secrecy laws, especially the reporting
requirements that have been implemented since 9/11, have led to
burdensome and invasive reporting requirements. 51 But despite their poor
implementation and unintended consequences, there is no legitimate reason
to avoid these requirements except money laundering and tax evasion. And,
indeed, Bitcoins have become a fairly robust platform by which to engage
in illegal transactions.
There is an “underground” Internet, known as the TOR network, 52 which
exists mainly to provide anonymity through multiple layers of blind identity
encryption. This network, outside of the traditional Internet, has been used
to buy and sell black market goods, but until recently the major hurdle to
implementation has been the inability to anonymously ensure payment.
Bitcoins have led to a Silk Road website on the TOR network by providing
the anonymous payment scheme needed to conduct illicit deals. The Silk
Road and its progeny, underground Internet hubs for the sale of drugs and
50. CTM1 (the cost of traditional money in a transaction) minus CCC (the fixed cost to
create the coin) minus RP (the risk premium associated with losses, thefts, frauds) equals
VCV (the value of a virtual coin).
51. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations – Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to
Money Services Businesses, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2011) (the “MSB Rule”). This
defines an MSB as
a person wherever located doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or
as an organized or licensed business concern, wholly or in substantial part
within the United States, in one or more of the capacities listed in paragraphs
(ff)(1) through (ff)(6) of this section. This includes but is not limited to
maintenance of any agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States.
52. The Onion Router, so-called because its Russian-doll layers of encryption are
likened to the layers of an onion.
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other contraband, spring into existence as fast as the DEA and FBI can shut
them down. 53 In October 2013, the U.S. government shut down the Silk
Road website and seized $28 million in Bitcoins,54 but a second Silk Road
came online soon afterwards. In fact, it seems likely that the convenience
of virtual currency and anonymity of the TOR underground network will
lead to a persistent online black market from this point onward.
The U.S. Senate has held hearings aimed at discovering whether these
so-called crypto-currencies are a tool for drug dealers and money launderers
to do business beyond official scrutiny, and stat regulators have held panels
on how best to manage the panorama of new virtual currencies. Bitcoins
can be “legal means of exchange” according to officials from the U.S.
Justice Department, which recognizes “that virtual currencies, in and of
themselves, are not illegal.” 55 Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke wrote to the
Senate committee the U.S. central bank has no plans to regulate the
currency: “Although the Federal Reserve generally monitors developments
in virtual currencies and other payments system innovations, it does not
necessarily have authority to directly supervise or regulate these
innovations or the entities that provide them to the market.”
The use of virtual currency in money laundering enterprises is
concerning. The goal of traditional money laundering is to channel money
through a source of intermediary so as to conceal its source.56 Prosecuting
virtual currency exchanges has little chance of diminishing the use of
virtual currency in money laundering. 57

53. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, HSI Seizes Silk Road
Underground Black Market Website (Oct. 2, 2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/1310/131002baltimore.htm.
54. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Seizure of Additional $28 Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William
Ulbricht, Alleged Owner and Operator of “Silk Road” Website (Oct. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-seizureof-additional-28-million-worth-of-bitcoins-belonging-to-ross-william-ulbricht-alleged-ownerand-operator-of-silk-road-website.
55. Max Raskin, U.S. Agencies to Say Bitcoins Offer Legitimate Benefits, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 18, 2013, 4:08 PM CT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-18/u-s-agenciesto-say-bitcoins-offer-legitimate-benefits.html (quoting Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant
Attorney General at Justice Department’s Criminal Division, at the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs).
56. OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999).
57. Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-a-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency
Exchanges Won't Stop Online Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2014), available at
https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/17113-lcb181art1christopherpdf.

2014]

REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY

17

3. The Public Ledger
A third reason for the use of virtual currency is the public creation of a
transfer ledger as part of the Bitcoin transfer process. Bitcoins cannot be
transferred without a public key encrypted transfer ledger. Despite their
reputation as anonymous, encrypted records of every transfer back to the
initial creation of the currency exists and is public. It is very likely that
these records will be (or have already been) decrypted to discover the
record of their sale. This kind of ledger paradoxically makes the laundering
of virtual currency or purchase of illicit goods much riskier than certain
international money transfer procedures.
This should be a boon to law enforcement agencies who seek to
understand the flow of the black market. Even assuming that the identities
of the transferors remains anonymous, the raw data regarding transfer is
available publicly. This will enable the research into the extremely
nebulous and difficult-to-penetrate world of the illegal marketplace. Merely
the existence of this public ledger will benefit law enforcement as it will
offer insights into areas where enforcement is lax, or where resources
would be more efficiently applied.
Another benefit to law enforcement in the virtual currency is the ease by
which this value may be seized. Currently, the largest single owner of
bitcoins, after the creator, is the FBI. 58 Seized from illegal TOR networks,
bitcoins can be obtained by physically seizing the servers on which the
wallets are held, or virtually, by forcing a transfer of publicly available
bitcoins. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction need only probable
cause to seize property connected with criminal enterprise, and as the
technology to track sales and the identities of users develops, methods to
seize Coins that have been used to facilitate illicit sales will become
routine. If routine seizure of Coins used in illicit transactions becomes
standard, the cost of using virtual currency to engage in illegal activity will
rise.
Traditional money laundering techniques generally cost about 10% of the
money to be cleansed. Thus, law enforcement needs only to find and seize a
relatively small portion of the money used in illegal transfers before the
costs rise to a level that will deter virtual currency from being used in this
58. Press Release, FBI, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Seizure of Additional $28
Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William Ulbricht, Alleged Owner and Operator
of “Silk Road” Website (Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/pressreleases/2013/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-seizure-of-additional-28-million-worth-ofbitcoins-belonging-to-ross-william-ulbricht-alleged-owner-and-operator-of-silk-road-website.
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fashion. I will elucidate in a future article the methods by which this may be
achieved.
4. Cryptographic Security and Account Protection
If a Bitcoin is stolen, the only loss has been the value of the coin. It
exists as a unit of exchange itself, and not an account or balance. The
amount of value that can be lost to a hacker is limited to the amount that is
kept online, while those kept in offline “wallets,” which are really just
computer memory storage units kept unconnected to the internet, cannot be
seized. While there are other ways of potentially taking offline Coins,
having an upper bound on loss can be comforting.
The pure technological marvel of virtual currency is exciting. The
implementation of the Bitcoin and the cryptographic ideas embodied within
are fascinating and ingenious. The use of virtual currency embodies, for
some in the technical community, the radical democratization and antiauthoritarian ideology that techno-futurists covet. 59 Whether these goals are
laudable or misguided is beyond the scope of this article.
B. What Disadvantages Do Bitcoins Have?
1. Theft
The major downside of virtual currency is the other side of the coin to its
major advantage: the ease of transfer makes them easily stolen. There is
very little consumer protection at any level of a Bitcoin transaction. Losses
from theft, fraud, or failure to live up to a contract will generally go
unrecovered.
Bitcoins can be attacked in several methods. The most dangerous point
of contact is in the exchange, when Bitcoins are offered up for sale and can
be transferred at this point. This has led to some commentators to believe
that regulation should focus on the exchange phase. Bitcoins themselves
enjoy 128-bit public-key security: they are equally secure as any encrypted
website or online purchase in terms of pure cryptography. The issues that
have arisen have all been human error. Mt. Gox and FlexCoin were badly
programed for security. 60 The owners of the sites probably committed
criminal malfeasance leading to the losses from the sites. 61 Poorly picked
59. Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency,
SSRN (May 8, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294124.
60. Leaked code purported to belong to Flexcoin shows key failures to meet industrystandards regarding privacy. The first warning sign may have been when the secret passkeys
for customer’s Coins were used as plaintext web addresses.
61. Greene v. MtGox Inc., No. 1:14-cv-1437 Doc. 1, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2014).
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passwords and sloppy programming account for the vast majority of stolen
Bitcoins. Once stolen, Bitcoins are effectively gone and cannot be returned,
even though the block chain has recorded the theft.
In early November of 2013, researchers at Cornell University published a
paper asserting that the virtual currency can be broken if the system of
mining algorithms can be successfully exploited by a group of sufficiently
selfish miners who obtain a majority control of the current mining pool. 62
Authorities in the United States have cracked down on the criminal use
of virtual currencies in a few cases, but those have been isolated situations
in which the coins have been used for illegal purposes in the real world, like
money laundering and trade in illicit goods. The owner of the Silk Road, a
website where drugs and weapons could be bought with Bitcoins, was
arrested earlier this year after attempting to procure an assassination of a
business rival. 63
But for crimes contained within the Bitcoin network — like thefts from
apparently reputable online wallets where Bitcoins are stored — there has
been almost no accountability.
Unauthorized transfer of bitcoins is very easy when few precautions are
taken, but can be made extremely difficult if some relatively
straightforward precautions are put into place. Bitcoins are secured using
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which simply means that some encryption
code – a “private key” or password - is established for every public Bitcoin
address, and that private key must be used to decrypt and spend Bitcoins.
This private key is really nothing more than a text file with gibberish
written inside. Theft occurs when an unauthorized user accesses that text
file, which enables them to spend the bitcoin. Theft is by far the biggest
security vulnerability. But loss is also a concern; there have been many
instances of individuals accidentally losing the private keys that allow them
to spend their Bitcoins. If the text file is deleted with no backups, the
bitcoin cannot be spent, and the result is that it becomes useless and loses
its value.
Exchanges face more problems, because they are known sites offering
continually available Coins. On March 2, 2014 Flexcoin was attacked and
robbed of all coins in the hot wallet. The attacker made off with 896 BTC
transferring them into two anonymous addresses. Flexcoin released a notice
that simply stating that, because it did “not have the resources, assets, or
62. Ittay Eyal & Emin Gun Sirer, Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is
Vulnerable, CORNELL UNIV. LIBRARY ARXIV.ORG (Nov. 15, 2013), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1311.
0243v5.pdf.
63. Paid in Bitcoin, naturally.
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otherwise to come back from this loss, [the Flexcoin exchange would close
its] doors immediately.” A small notice in the terms of use offered the
following cryptic waiver of liability: “Legal Notice: We are not a true bank
that accepts USD or any national currency, only bitcoins which by their
nature are not regulated, we’re not FDIC insured or regulated by any
government entity.” The Alberta-based Flexcoin simply declared
bankruptcy after determining that two of its accounts had been hacked.
The largest exchange, Mt. Gox, which had been losing Coins over the
course of several months, first deducted their losses from customer
accounts, and then declared bankruptcy. Being based in Japan, where
virtual currency is looked upon unfavorably, chances of customers
obtaining recourse are slim.
The largest Bitcoin payment processor in Europe, BIPS, has been hacked
for a loss of about $1 million worth of Bitcoins, including coins that were in
the personal online wallets of customers. The company,stated that it would
be “unable to reimburse Bitcoins lost unless the stolen coins are retrieved.”
While Danish police were examining the case BIPS further stated that the
authorities could “not classify this as a theft due to the current
nonregulation of Bitcoin.” 64
The People’s Bank of China, among five Chinese agencies released a
notice that they would not use virtual currency that citizens of the country
would still be allowed to buy and sell, but it warned that participants
“assume the risks themselves.” 65 This lack of protection is likely a
calculated disincentive for the use of virtual currency in China, ensuring
that Chinese banks retain tight control of the Yuan. 66
Fraud may also be (and has been) perpetrated by an exchange client: an
exchange sends money to a client, but the client says that they never
received it; when the exchange tries to find the transaction using the Bitcoin
hash, which is the record in the block chain that allows you to identify the
transaction, the exchange cannot find it because it has been changed by the
client. Since the exchange cannot find the hash, their program assumes
there was an error with their system and a second transfer is attempted.
64. Nathaniel Popper, In the Murky World of Bitcoin, Fraud Is Quicker Than the Law,
N.Y TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/in-the-murky-world-ofbitcoin-fraud-is-quicker-than-the-law/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
65. Monetary Policy Analysis Grp. of the People’s Bank of China, China Monetary
Policy Report: Quarter Four, 2013 (Feb. 8, 2014), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/
image_public/UserFiles/english/upload/File/2013MPR-afterNancy(1).pdf
66. Lou Yao-xiong, Wu Jun, Analysis of Legal Issues of Bitcoin, 15 J. BEIJING UNIV.
POSTS & TELECOMMUNICATIONS 25 (2013) (Social Sciences Edition).

2014]

REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY

21

Dishonest clients may use this fraud to double and triple dip while rapidly
sending the command withdrawing their money, receiving consecutive
transfers. This vulnerability is known as “malleability.” While this
vulnerability of the Bitcoin protocol allowing this type of fraud has been
known for several years, and the Bitcoin Foundation has offered protocol
fixes that prevent properly-run exchanges from facing this fraud, several
exchanges have been bankrupted after the fix was released. Mt. Gox and
FlexCoin operated a version of the protocol that inadequately addressed the
malleability issue. However, malleability should no longer be considered an
exploitable problem, despite many exchanges confirming malleability
thefts.
There has already been one major possible attack on Bitcoin elaborated,
which would involve one person obtaining control of a major portion of the
Coin mining computer network and maliciously holding back portions of
the block chain. This attack, while potentially serious, is beyond the scope
of the article, except to note in passing that other attacks may be discovered
in the future that pose significant risks to the currency.
The risk of theft, where liability should fall, and what waivers consumers
can be expected to accept will be discussed below.
2. Poor Speed and Excessive Resource Use
The second major downside of Bitcoins, and any currently foreseeable
virtual currency, is its inefficiency. Bitcoins are tremendously inefficient in
three ways: Time, Computing Resources, and Transmission Data. Coins
“cost” a lot of computing power to simulate trust by brute-force solving
algorithms to verify trades. 67 This uses a massive amount of energy; and to
encourage users to make this sacrifice, users must be paid in inflationary
currency. Bitcoin is far less efficient than our current banking and credit
card system for most trades. No transfer can take place without the brute
force computations to verify the transfer, which means they must always
take more time than a single-point transfer will. Lowering the time it takes
to make such a transfer would be untenable, as it would open the Bitcoin up
to several vulnerabilities that would render them useless. Unfortunately,
Coins will always cost resources to transfer, and those resources must
always be paid by (presumably neutral) third-parties. Those parties must be
paid, either through inflation or direct payment, in order for the system to
function.

67. William J. Luther, CryptoCurrencies, Network Effects, and Switching Costs
(Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-17, 2013).
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When you distribute the business ledger, you can no longer simply talk
to a single point of authority (as exists for credit card transactions,
elaborated above), and all transactions must wait until they are verified by
anonymous other players on the network. Instead of it taking a few
milliseconds, it takes several minutes to get back an answer. Transactions in
Bitcoin are designed to take about ten minutes to process, and attempts to
speed this up would make the system insecure. Less time would permit
double-spending of bitcoins or permit users with large relative computing
power to solve multiple transfers without publicly verifying them and
ruining the network by thereby destroying the incentive for others on the
network to verify transfers. 68
Currently, Coin trading volume is low, but the volume of trading has
little effect on the timing or resource costs of Bitcoin. Again, it is the
double-edged sword of virtual currency that all “costs” of a transfer remain
fixed, whether the payment is for one dollar or one million dollars. Whether
trading volume is low or high, the protocol itself is limited to 7 transactions
per second. For comparison, a major retailer could engage in 5,000
transactions per second on Black Friday. Wal-Mart’s 10 million
transactions between 8 p.m. and midnight on Black Friday of 2012 would
take Bitcoin system more than 800 days to record.69 Bitcoins must remain
limited to relatively infrequent purchasing systems, which again make them
useful for globalized product purchases and not much else.
3. Third Party Mining
The last problem with Bitcoins is that they require third parties to do
work in order to generate the block chain. The third party computers bruteforce a cryptographic solution to the problem posed by the transaction,
which has been summarized to the public as “solving difficult math
problems.” In order to incentivize third parties to use their resources, this
stage of the transaction has been termed mining, because miners receive
payments of new Bitcoins for successfully solving the math problems. New

68. Matthias Herrmann, Implementation, Evaluation and Detection of a DoublespendAttack on Bitcoin (Apr. 24, 2012) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Department of Computer
Science, ETH Zürich, available at http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:5606/eth-560601.pdf.
69. Jessica Wohl, Reuters, Walmart Says It Has Best Black Friday Ever Despite
Protests, Crowds, HUFFPOST BUSINESS (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/11/23/walmart-best-black-friday_n_2178541.html.
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Bitcoins are generated when miners solve a transaction and the miner owns
those new Bitcoins. 70
If virtual currency becomes widespread, new developments either in
technology, in law, or agreements by major institutions, will be required to
solve the 51% problem identified by cryptographers.71
Currently, mining generates a tremendous amount of money (in the form
of Bitcoins). The temptation to create value merely by expending computer
processing power is so great that there exists a market for Bitcoin mining
computers. 72 There are also already criminal hackers who have used
computers in an unauthorized manner in order to mine Bitcoins. A New
Jersey software company created a botnet to mine coins. 73 And a computer
science student at Harvard exceeded his authorization to use a
supercomputer to mine Dogecoins. 74
Presently 3,600 bitcoins are created per day, which totals to 1,314,000
new Coins each year. This means Bitcoin currently has a monetary inflation
rate of over 10% per annum. All of the new Coins are owned by the miners
to incentivize them to process and verify other users’ transactions. There
are about 60,000 transactions per day on the bitcoin network. That accounts
for an upper bound of 4,000 new coins created per day, if blocks are
confirmed slightly quicker than an average of ten minutes each. For each
transaction on the bitcoin network, miners receive 1/15th of a bitcoin.
When bitcoin was worth $1,000 each miner earned $66 in virtual currency
for every network transaction they solved.

70. A. Bogliolo, P. Polidori, A. Aldini, W. Moreira, P. Mendes, M. Yildiz, C. Ballester
& J. Seigneur, Virtual Currency and Reputation-Based Cooperation Incentives in UserCentric Networks, paper delivered at the 8th International Wireless Communications and
Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC), Aug. 27-31, 2012), available at http://iee
explore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsptp=&arnumber=6314323&isnumber=6314161.
71. Eyal & Sirer, supra note 62; see also Nicolas Houy, It Will Cost You Nothing to
"Kill" a Proof-of-Stake Crypto-Currency (Groupe D’analyse de Théorie Économique,
Working Paper No. WP 1404, Jan. 2014), available at http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/
docs/00/94/50/53/PDF/1404.pdf.
72. Daniel Plohmann & Elmar Gerhards-Padilla, Case Study of the Miner Botnet
(papewr delivered at the 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON) (2012)),
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6243985&isnum
ber=6243954.
73. Complaint, Hoffman v. E-Sports Entm’t (Super. Ct. of N.J. Nov. 19, 2013),
available at http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases13/E-Sports_Complaint_Consent-Judgment.pdf.
74. Danny Lee, Harvard University Student Hijacks Computer to Mine Dogecoin
Currency, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/world/
article/1434773/harvard-university-student-hijacks-computer-mine-dogecoin-currency.
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Ultimately, it costs the network from $40 to $70 per transaction, in the
form of inflation. Compare this to normal credit cards, where the average
transaction fee is $2 or $3. Bitcoin transactions cost up to 20 times as much
as credit card transactions. Right now, this cost is being masked through
monetary inflation. Take the inflation out of the system, and all of those
costs would have to be paid in transaction fees. This economic system can
never achieve stability. 75
There are methods of mitigating or eliminating this aspect of virtual
currency, 76 but public ledger virtual currencies can never completely
eliminate the tragedy of the commons and all transfers between peers will
require that others do work for their benefit.77 It may be that a system of
contracts or traditional arrangements will come into shape similar to the
EFT network that currently exists between banks. 78
III. Virtual Currency: Currency, Commodity, or Contract?
A. Currency?
To begin thinking generally about the regulatory schemes we may
envision, let us first determine what we are discussing. Having provided a
general overview of the Bitcoin, what it is and how it works, let us try to
categorize it.
A Bitcoin doesn’t have any backing government or even regulatory body
protecting its value or ensuring its legitimate use. This is the most obvious
distinction against its being considered a currency. It has not been issued by
any governmental body, or even an organization with quasi-authoritarian
status. 79 Additionally, it is not used with the level of frequency or
confidence to be considered a means of transaction. It is not a currency.

75. Jörg Becker, Dominic Breuker, Tobias Heide, Justus Holler, Hans Peter Rauer &
Rainer Böhme, Can We Afford Integrity by Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by the
Bitcoin Currency, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 135 (Rainer
Böhme ed., 2013) available at http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-394980_7.
76. Simon Barber, Xavier Boyen, Elaine Shi & Ersin Uzun, Bitter to Better — How to
Make Bitcoin a Better Currency, STANFORD UNIV.: APPLIED CRYPTO GROUP, http://crypto.
stanford.edu/~xb/fc12/bitcoin.pdf (last visited July 2, 2014).
77. Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren & Aviv Zohar., On Bitcoin and Red
Balloons (Feb. 2012), available at http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/156072/bitcoin.pdf.
78. See ETFs described supra.
79. .François R. Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, CHICAGO FED LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi.), Dec. 2013, No. 317.
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Eric Posner believes Bitcoins are a form of commodity; albeit one
unregulated by the government:
There is a long history of unregulated currencies. Gold has
been an unregulated currency at various times and in various
places. In prison camps, cigarettes have served as currency. In
the United States in the 19th Century, in some states, the
currency was basically unregulated; people would set up banks
that issued bank notes that circulated. Sometimes you get an
unregulated currency simply because there is no government.
Sometimes you get an unregulated currency because there is a
government but it does not control the money supply very well
or the government is corrupt and people do not trust the official
currency. Bitcoin just seems to be another version of this. It is a
lot like gold, in fact. The difference, of course, is that it is digital
rather than a heavy, unwieldy object. That means that it could
serve the same purposes as gold in terms of a currency, but much
more efficiently because it does not have any mass and can be
sent easily from place to place.80
Posner has some legal precedent on his side: A Texas federal district
court ruled that Bitcoins were a currency for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction. 81 But the most commonly used definitions of currency: Is the
currency widely accepted as a medium of exchange and does it share a
common value? In the case of Bitcoins, both definitions must be considered
flexibly. Bitcoins are widely accepted as medium of exchange in sheer
geographic area (they have been used in forty countries at least), which puts
them in a different arena than pseudo-currencies like cigarettes or company
script. And they share a common value in the sense that their purported fair
market value is available on a live exchange at all times. But this is not the
whole story.
FinCEN’s regulations define currency (also referred to as “real”
currency) as “the coin and paper money of the United States or of any other
country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii]
is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of

80. Interview with Eric Posner, TOP OF MIND (Goldman Sachs Global Investment
Research Paper), Mar. 11, 2014, Issue 21, at 4.
81. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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issuance.” 82 The IRS has also come out against Bitcoins’ status as
currency. 83
In my judgment Bitcoins are not currency because they do not represent
stable measurements of value. The value of a Bitcoin is far too speculative
to be considered currency. Bitcoins famously have an upper bound built
into the system: By 2024 no new Bitcoins will be made and all mining
payments will be done through payment of existing Bitcoins. This is
designed to prevent runaway inflation.
Believers in this system tend to underestimate the costs. “Big miners and
mining pools would be stupid to do things that undermine confidence in
bitcoin and make their investment worth less. I predict history will repeat
itself, and the current panic over GHash.IO will self-correct over the next
few weeks.” 84 But the booms and crashes in the currency, reflecting its
speculative value, belie the truth.
In effect, Bitcoin can never be a currency because its value can never
achieve stability. Disregarding the lack of a stabilizing central bank, even in
an ideal free market the pressures inherent to the Bitcoin will necessarily
create radical price differences on a continual basis. My theory has thus far
been borne out by the bubble, bust, and recovery of Bitcoins to date. With
no stable measure of value, Bitcoins can never be used as currency.
B. Commodity?
Is Bitcoin a commodity? It has more characteristics in common with
commodities than with currency, except for the most essential: It has no
inherent value. Virtual property can have value,85 but the natural value of
Bitcoin is nothing, or close to nothing, and values above equivalent
transactions fees on arbitrage are purely speculative.
“Commodity” defines any item that “accommodates” our physical wants
and needs. And one of these physical wants is the need for a store of value.
Throughout history humans have used different commodities as a store of
value (cocoa beans, pork bellies, oranges, or most commonly: gold). 86 In
contrast, a security is any instrument that is “secured” against something
82. 31 C.F.R. 1010.100(m) (2011).
83. IRS Pub. Notice 2014-21 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-1421.pdf.
84. Robert McMillan, Bitcoin Stares Down Impending Apocalypse (Again), WIRED (Jan.
10, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/ghash/ (inteview with Gary Andresen).
85. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Penn. 2007).
86. Dominic Wilson & Jose Ursua, Is Bitcoin a Currency? No, TOP OF MIND (Goldman
Sachs Global Investment Research Paper), Mar. 11, 2014, Issue 21, at 6.
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else. As a currency is usually secured by a commodity or a government’s
ability to tax and defend, it is considered to be a security. By these
definitions, bitcoin is a commodity, and not a currency, while Bitcoin with
a capital “B” is the technology, or network, that bitcoin moves across. 87 The
analogy would be Shale technology versus shale oil.
Still, bitcoins can be sold as investment instruments. A Southlake oil and
gas company ran afoul of Texas securities regulators after raising capital
through the bitcoin. 88 The Texas State Securities Board ordered Balanced
Energy to stop selling securities on the grounds that it had failed to disclose
to its investors the risk of financing operations through a virtual currency
subject to large fluctuations in value.89 Clearly virtual currency can achieve
value if intrinsically tied to some other, real value or venture. In such cases,
virtual currency is a form of readily traded stock or method of establishing
ownership of a more traditional commodity, like oil or gold.
It is almost universally accepted that any commodity that would
make a good store of value should be stable over time (nonreactive). Though not as stable as gases, gold and other precious
metals are the least reactive elements that are in solid form.
Bitcoin is “reactive” since software change has occurred in the
past. There are thousands of bitcoin miners that maintain the
Bitcoin network by using their computing power to verify
transactions and place them in a block chain. If a majority of this
computing power switched their software to adopt a change, then
effectively that new software would become the standard and
any verification using the old software would be rejected. Gold
also has nearly no competing substitutes that can erode its value.
Silver is more reactive and plentiful than gold. Palladium is far
less dense. While platinum can compete with gold on most
physical attributes, it is too rare and has catalytic properties that
bid it away from investment demand. Competition is likely
bitcoin’s weakest point, as its position was only secured by being
the first mover. However, primary competitors – Litecoin and
Ripple – are not yet a serious threat. Litecoin is bitcoin’s silver
87. Jeff Currie, Bullion Bests bitcoin, Not Bitcoin, TOP OF MIND (Goldman Sachs Global
Investment Research Paper), Mar. 11, 2014, Issue 21, at 7.
88. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex.
filed Aug. 6, 2013).
89. Id.
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and is less valuable and secure. Ripple is an exchange that
supports multiple commodities including bitcoin, gold and
silver. 90
I say this because, as far as I can see, the only true value of a virtual
currency is the ease with which it can be used in payment, both intra and
internationally. Virtual currency, as I’ve said above, easily facilitates
international payments and avoids several costs and delays that come with
traditional international banking. The difference between these costs and
the cost of using a method of virtual currency are the value of that virtual
currency, and a Bitcoin can be said to have this value. In a world like ours
today, where the costs of international payment are high and the costs of
using a virtual currency are (theoretically) low, Bitcoin technology, and
thus bitcoins, have some inherent absolute value.
C. Contracts Transferring IP
But how should we consider this economic value? I’ve already explained
why Bitcoins are not currency, nor are they commodities. They are best
thought of as contracts stipulating the creation and ownership of new
intellectual property. The promise to send someone a Bitcoin is a service,
and the newly created serial number hash is a new copyright. Bitcoins are
more similar to contracts for loans or expense accounts than they are to
mechanisms of finance or securities. This means that regulatory agencies
that start from the preconception of regulating methods of international
commerce are destined to fail unless they begin with an a priori framework
of international contract and IP protection. Some authors have argued that
online property should be held to traditional property law forms for mere
simplicity; that permitting electronic ownership to be governed by contract
would be conceptually difficult to function.91 While this means such
considerations are more difficult initially, once such mechanisms are in
place they will be very easy to modify and adapt as technology advances or
methods of use change. 92

90. Currie, supra note 87.
91. Juliet M. Moringiello. Towards a System of Estates in Virtual Property. SSRN (July
23, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070184 (Widener Law School Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 08-22).
92. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63 (2004-2005) (how jurisdictional issues and commercial disputes in virtual worlds
may be litigated in the future).
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The protected material of a Bitcoin is the gibberish saved in the text file
that the current owner possesses. 93 This text file can be used to hash a new
file when the Coin is transferred, kept safe and hidden offline to store the
bitcoin, or sent to an online currency exchange that will hold the bitcoin in
trust. Random characters on a text file can certainly enjoy the same
copyright protections 94 as an original novel. 95 Fixation may take the form of
printed zeros and ones. 96 The originality requirement is more than satisfied,
because the random numbers are indeed the result of pseudorandom
processes, the hashing of which takes systematic effort by the worker’s
computer. 97
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right “to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” 98 Congress
defined derivative works as those “based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.” 99 Works “consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship” are also considered “derivative
works.” 100 The derivative work right can stretch to the point where the

93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Literary works” are works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords,
film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied).
94. Id. § 102(a) (copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device).
95. Any “physical rendering” of the fruits of the author’s creativity will “fix” the work
in a “tangible medium of expression.” Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
96. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
97. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Toro Co. v. R
& R Prods. Co., 787 F. 2d 1208 (8th Circ. 1986); see also Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
99. Id. § 101.
100. Id.
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resulting work bears little resemblance to the original.101 Thus, the
derivative work right prohibits “the unauthorized use of expressive
elements in subsequent works, regardless of whether such use involves any
‘copying’ in the ordinary sense of the term.” 102 Accordingly, person who
has no authority to make a derivative work cannot copyright such a work. 103
Each time a Bitcoin is transferred and the hash chain is extended, a new
derivative work is created. Although the derivatives are created by the
former owners, transferor, and miners, the derivatives are all owned by the
person who owns the copyright in the original work. That person is
necessarily the transferee---i.e., the new owner of the Bitcoin. The prior
owners still own their works, but those works are random characters on a
text file that have no value anymore because they cannot be used to make
further payments. 104 Only the latest version of the Coin (the one that has
been publicly verified as the latest on the block chain) is the work of IP
with any value. The owner of the derivative work does not legally prejudice
the original owner’s ownership of the underlying work, but in practical fact
the creation of a new Coin upon transfer renders them unable to use the
Coin they possess.
Obviously, all parties working in the Bitcoin network have agreed (by
virtue of their entrance into the system) that they disclaim ownership of the
Coins they create for transfer. The new Coins are created pursuant to the
terms of the sales contract that has been agreed to prior to the creation of
the Coin. 105 Thus, the agreement to sell something in exchange for a Bitcoin
necessarily includes the understanding that the Buyer will create a
derivative work upon transfer. The block chain created by miners is the
paid-for addition to a compilation for which they disclaim any rights by
publication. 106
Bitcoins, in their current form, comfortably fit into the realm of written
works for which copyright protection applies upon creation. Bitcoin hash
numbers are the material to be protected. They are unique, created by
101. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entmt., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding the fact that a quiz book could infringe the Seinfeld television
series).
102. Lateef Mtima, So Dark the Con(tu) of Man: The Quest for a Software Derivative
Work Right in Section 117, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 57 (2008).
103. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1983).
104. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
105. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1010 (1995); Dumas with Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F. 2d 410 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
106. N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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resource-intensive processes, and each Bitcoin is created for commercial
purposes. Ownership lasts beyond the useful life of the Coin.
Sales contracts can also include speculative venture.107 Bitcoins are not
illusive; they clearly have some value and even just the transmission of
random code is worth enough to the transferee that such contracts are not
illusive. The property right for this kind of virtual currency does not exist
until the new Coin comes into being; once the transfer has been confirmed
and the transferee seizes the new Coin hash number. 108 Purchases fall into
the jurisdiction of traditional contract law: they are a swap of whatever the
buyer is making in exchange for a promise to generate IP under the seller’s
employ.
IV. Present and Future Regulatory Scheme of Virtual Currency
A. Current Regulatory Environment
1. Legal Use of Virtual Currency
The US Constitution 109 and the Stamp Payments Act of 1862 110 give the
Federal Government the exclusive authority to create official coinage and
currency of the United States. Printing a currency that is meant to compete
with or confuse people about which is the legal tender is a crime. 111 But the
use of bartering, prepaid cards and other stores of value and virtual
currency is permitted as long as applicable laws are complied with. 112 The
notion of lenity and general usage indicates that the creation and promotion
of virtual currency does not violate any current statutes.113 Contracts
stipulating payment in virtual currency simply specify the method by which
value established upon the U.S. dollar is to be paid.114

107. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 US 837 (S.Ct. 1975).
108. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805).
109. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2012). The Stamp Act has been cited by several scholars as
potentially rendering Bitcoins illegal. However, the law is likely inapplicable.
111. Michael Socarras & Lata Nott, Does the Constitution Have Anything to Say About
Bitcoin and Money Laundering?, TMT PERSPECTIVES (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.tmtperspec
tives.com/2014/02/28/does-the-constitution-have-anything-to-say-about-bitcoin-and-moneylaundering/.
112. United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1878).
113. Anchorage Cen D. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P. 2d 596 (Alaska
1968).
114. Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F. 2d 166 (8th Cir. 1938),
judgment set aside on other grounds, 107 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1939).
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However, there is currently no regulatory scheme to protect consumers
of virtual currency, nor is there a system to prevent virtual currency from
being used to buy illicit goods or launder money. The current applicable
laws are as follows.
There is the general protection against hacking. Federal laws prevent
unauthorized computer entry. Notably, because Bitcoins are not money,
theft of them from computers is more violative because of the unauthorized
entry than because of the theft. It would be interesting to see prosecution
against a Bitcoin thief, as the prosecutor would have difficulty establishing
the fair market value of such an intangible. Unlike most software, there is
no readily identifiable fair market value because the frequency of trade is so
low and there is no centralized producer offering goods for regular sale. It
would be like attempting to determine the fair market value of a particular
stock when trading occurred rarely and through disparate, unknown parties.
It would be more productive to charge the suspect for the mere act of
exceeding their authority and engaging in fraud,115 or into a computer
involved in a financial institution, such as a virtual currency exchange.116
Additional applicable statutes include, of course, federal prohibitions
against money laundering, and state regulatory schemes under the federal
Banking Secrecy Act. The use of Bitcoin in such a scheme is problematic.
In the event that the malleability problems (“the 51% problem”)
plaguing virtual currency becomes widespread, it is possible that antitrust
penalties imposed by the Department of Justice will be the only source of
relief for the aggrieved public.117
2. Illegal Use of Virtual Currency
It is feared that new methods of virtual currency will “help criminals
launder massive amounts of money. More girls will be sold as sex slaves,
more rhinos will be poached, and every other large-scale transnational
crime that you can name is going to become a lot easier if criminals have a
way to transfer very large amounts of money completely anonymously.” 118

115. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
116. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
117. Unlawful monopoly under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; illegal restrictive
dealing agreements prohibited by section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14; and unlawful
agreements in restraint of interstate trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1. See Eyal & Sirer, supra note 62.
118. E.J. Fagan, Bitcoin and International Crime (Commentary), BALT. SUN, Nov. 25,
2013, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-bitcoin-20131125,0,3265347
.story
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Some countries, such as Denmark and China, have already announced
that stolen bitcoins are not going to be investigated. The risks lie entirely on
the consumers if their meaningless gibberish files are lost, stolen, or
corrupted. But even this system is untenable in the long term. Capital
ventures are being funded through virtual currency already, illicit purchases
are being tendered, and insurance companies may be called upon to pay for
losses in virtual currency. Simply ignoring them or calling them prima facie
without value is a blasé to the current state of reality, and will become
ludicrously neglectful if virtual currencies continue to develop.
This neglect will create geographical “black holes” where virtual
currency is nether protected nor investigated, which will in turn lead to their
increased use in illicit purchases and to launder money from other
countries. The existence of these regulatory black spots must be ended or
overcome by the United States if virtual currency can continue to be used
productively but under the banner of the law. I propose the following
developments to ensure that virtual currency does not become synonymous
with illegality.
B. Future Regulatory Development
1. How Virtual Currency as IP Logically Orders the System
If we consider each virtual currency transaction to be a contract
obligating one party to the creation of intellectual property owned by the
other party, a conception of the ideal regulatory scheme becomes more
comprehensible. It also makes obvious how attempts to regulate virtual
currencies as forms of currency or commodity are inadequate.
To regulate virtual currency as a form of commodity would be to
regulate the speculation of an item of trivial value. Once the market
stabilizes on virtual currency, proposed regulatory framework will become
redundant. The recent price bubble of Bitcoins is a byproduct of several
recent developments, but any proposed legislative solution would be
unnecessary at this time. I reject the regulation of Bitcoins in particular and
virtual currency in general in the commodity arena as an unnecessary
solution to a nonexistent problem. I remain open to modifying this assertion
if digital currencies remain at their hyper-inflated price points beyond their
current status as novelties.
How much SEC involvement would be tolerated or desirable in virtual
currency? To consider virtual currency a security would likely engender
regulatory barriers sufficient to destroy the system in its nascent form and
lock out future development. Might Bitcoins be considered securities,
though? Certainly, their nominal price is based almost purely on their
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speculative value. And the broad definition under the ’33 and ’34 Acts may
encompass at least some offers to sell virtual currency. 119
The problem lies with the “Supreme Court’s apparent inability to
comprehend thoroughly and to address analytically, consistently with the
language, legislative history, and underlying policies of the securities acts,
the important issues of federal securities regulation.”120
The Bitcoin network as a whole may have been created in order to sell
retained bitcoins once the price increased. But if Satoshi Nakamoto is truly
the creator of Bitcoin, they were not created in a speculative venture but
instead from a love of cryptography and the ease of payment opportunities
it offered. The Bitcoin publication documents certainly do not “offer or
endorse” bitcoins as securities or investment contracts. 121 The increase in
bitcoin prices seems to be a surprise to the creators. A Bitcoin is more like a
collectable trading card than a stock. It is more like an antique chair than a
real estate venture. The fact that the price has increased after the initial sale
is not reason enough to consider the entire product line to be a security.
Still, form is less important than economic reality when defining whether
an investment contract or note is in fact a security (and thus merits SEC
protection). 122 Are not bitcoins a profit-seeking venture to which clients
undertake a certain amount of risk? Certainly, those who buy bitcoins with
dollars risk their capital: The market price for Coins may decrease or they
may be unable to find subsequent purchasers to whom they may sell their
Coins. But are Bitcoin purchasers buying an investment, or consuming
digital goods? 123 Bitcoins may not have much utility, but they are not
themselves instruments dependent on the efforts of others. 124 And once
bitcoins are purchased, there is no vertical common enterprise between the
promotor and the new owner; each new owner no longer needs to maintain
a relationship with the old owner, and the transferor’s duty to and
ownership of the transferee’s new coin is nil. And there is no horizontal

119. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77z (2012); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78e-78mm (2012).
120. Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of
“Security”: The “Context Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their Ramifications,
40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 492 (1987).
121. To offer or endorse something as a security can make it a security for federal
jurisdictional purposes.
122. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
123. Cf. Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976);
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
124. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 2005).
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commonality between bitcoin investors. Under any jurisdiction’s test, the
Bitcoin network is not an investment scheme.
However, certain sales of virtual currency, or virtual currencies based
upon and backed by corporate interest certainly can be considered
securities. In these cases, the virtual currency will look substantially similar
to investment notes or other traditional investment contracts.125 I will
discuss the implications of this kind of arrangement below.
If we then resolve ourselves that Bitcoin hashes are original expression
and thus properties protected under copyright, several necessary legal
conclusions follow. First, the transmitted encryption is automatically
protected under American law, and identical copies by others can be
assumed to violate the original owner’s rights. The authorship of a Bitcoin
hash would be relatively easy to prove if one were to take the matter to
court: They could simply enter the record created when they published the
transfer. Of course, this has the effect of negating the pseudo-anonymity
for which Bitcoins are currently valued. This also means that damages can
be calculated as follows in the event of loss due to theft or fraud.
2. Calculating Damages
Subsequent transferees from an initial unapproved transfer will receive a
different hash, which renders their Bitcoin substantially distinct from the
initial Bitcoin that was unlawfully taken. So the person seeking to recover
damages for an unauthorized “taking” of their currency under the
protections of copyright must find the actual identity of the primary
transferee. If a suit is successful, because Bitcoins are unregistered by their
nature statutory damages will be unavailable and the suitor must seek actual
damages. The primary difficulty in proving actual damages will be in
determining the true value of the lost Bitcoins because fair market value is
deceptively illusive. Although public trading “prices” exist for Bitcoin,
trading frequency is currently extremely limited except in periods of high
volatility when prices change very rapidly. Thus, litigants will have to
dispute about what the actual fair market value of the stolen coins were in
every suit. Large thefts have historically coincided with dramatic price
drops in the Bitcoin exchange. Additionally, the current difficulty in
obtaining cash or goods for Bitcoins makes their real value particularly
contentious.

125. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex.
filed Aug. 6, 2013).
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Bitcoins offer the unique case where an exact replacement of the lost,
stolen, or destroyed IP will fully restore the plaintiff. There have already
been cases where defendants have been ordered to transfer bitcoins.126
While injunctions ordering transfer of coins may be the preferred method of
dealing with the situation, monetary damages need to be further normalized
before definitive statements can be made.
Theft of a bitcoin, or more precisely an unauthorized transfer of an
owned Coin by accessing the Coin’s secret number and using it to generate
a new hash in the new owner’s possession, can be difficult to trace and
difficult to prove. But assuming a case comes to court in the near future,
what value has the thief stolen, and what reparations will make the victim
whole?
If we think of the damages as relief for forms of copyright infringement,
damages may be calculated as for any standard software infringement case.
Statutory damages are unavailable because virtual currency is not a
protected publication. 127 Instead, courts would determine actual damages.
Calculating damages by comparing the plaintiff’s income before and after
the infringement would be very difficult to apply to Bitcoin theft, unless the
plaintiff is engaged in widespread currency exchange (like a Mt. Gox).128
Instead courts may calculate damages by based on what the copyright
owner would have received had she sold or licensed the work instead of
having it stolen. The only numbers that need to be determined are the
number of infringements and the value of the work. This still may be
difficult, however, because of the problems associated with pricing a work
if it has not been commercially sold (e.g. – a piece of original art from an
artist’s private collection). Virtual currency will use this method of
calculation for relief, although valuation would be more difficult than it
may originally seem.
Actual Damages are difficult to claim because the plaintiff must prove to
the court that their amount claimed for Actual Damages is accurate. 129
Plaintiffs need forensic accountants testify as their expert witness, who are
often opposed by forensic accountants for the defendants who can testify
that the damages are lower than the plaintiff claims. Many records
controlled by the plaintiff may become a part of the public record. It is
126. Bitvestment Partners LLC v. Coinlab, Inc. et al, 1:2013cv07632 (N.Y.S.D. filed
Oct. 29, 2013).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
128. CoinLab, Inc. v. Mt. Gox, Case 2:13-cv-00777-MJP, Doc. 21 (Oct. 4, 2013).
129. Recourse may be made to such sites as COINOMETRICS, http://www.coinometrics.
com/bitcoin/ (last visited July 2, 2014).
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possible to have the plaintiff’s financial records kept private from the
general public (if the court is convinced there is good cause to do so), but
the plaintiff will have no choice in turning over financial records to the
opposing party.
Plaintiffs with strong documentation showing lost profits have stronger
cases than those without them; but bitcoins are sold only once. Historical
sales records are very important for showing expected sales, but plaintiffs
will only be able to show their sales of other Coins, or the market value of
Coins sold at the time of the theft. In this case, the loss would be equal to
the value of a future Bitcoin sale that has been stymied by the theft, less the
original purchase price of the coin.130 This requires that the plaintiff make
some kind of showing that they would have sold the Bitcoin at a particular
time but for the theft. The value and timing could be calculated in a fashion
similar to the damages assessed to plaintiffs in securities cases where
plaintiffs were misled. Any documentation that was done in the normal
course of business will carry more weight than documents generated
specifically for the infringement claim.
In general, it seems that the remedies for lost virtual currency are
currently inadequate, even forgoing for the moment the difficulty in
tracking down the perpetrators in online theft.
3. How the Current System is Inadequate
The downsides of leaving this regime as-is are tremendous. 131 Another
objection, which is in my belief fatal to Bitcoins in their current form, is the
fact that copyright protections render Bitcoins extremely vulnerable to
overseas theft. There is very little agreement between the United States and
other countries where Bitcoins are primarily traded, and obtaining
protection for original expression in foreign jurisdictions can be arduous
and take longer than a similarly placed foreign transfer of funds.
Remember, in this article I consider Bitcoins’ primary competition to be
regulated bank transfers. A second objection under copyright would be the
privacy aspect. Remember how one of the benefits of Bitcoin is the public
transfer chain, with encrypted names of transferors. However, in order to
press ownership under an IP regime, transferors would have to make their
transfer and the encryption used to create the hash key public. This not only
reveals the formerly-anonymous transferor, but also makes it much more
likely that prior and subsequent bricks of the transfer chain can be
130. Actual damages relieves only lost profits, not lost value.
131. Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency,
SSRN (May 8, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294124.
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discovered and their anonymity can be compromised. This is a significant
disadvantage to Bitcoin protection and actually makes them less desirable
than traditional banking transfers for those seeking some degree of
anonymity. 132 At best, plaintiffs would win the case by tracking down the
thieves (already a difficult proposition) and after intensive fact-based
litigation recover their actual damages by opening their accounting ledgers
to the opposing parties.
C. Proposed Regulations
1. The Regulation of the Exchange E-Economy
The major reason Bitcoin is unsustainable for wider adoption is the lack
of government support. While the freedom promised by virtually exchanged
and cryptographically backed money may be ideologically appealing,
monetary relations are too closely interwoven with other economic,
political and social relations to be managed well by any institution with less
sway than a government. 133 The detailed work of money creation can be
delegated to independent central banks and to a credit system of regulated
private banks, but the ultimate authority of any functioning monetary
system will always be the ultimate political authority.
Attempts to create private currency only succeed in spaces where there is
no effective government: During revolutions, in remote geographical
locations, or in the black market. These situations all use private currency
only as a last resort. Bitcoin exemplifies some of the problems of private
money: Its value is uncertain, its legal status is unclear, and it could easily
become valueless if users lose faith. And there is a legitimate fear that if
Bitcoin ever starts to demonstrate true market value, governments will
either ban it or destroy its competitive advantage with overregulation.
As the Bitcoin experiment develops the government should seek to foster
its innovative advances while seeking to protect consumers and limit its
potential use for illegal activity. 134 The major structural framework I
propose is to include virtual currency in the state and federal legislative
framework as we consider the future of virtual currency. I will explicate in
a later article my proposed format for the next generation of virtual
currency, one which more closely resembles enforceable contracts. To
132. Reid & Harrigan, supra note 40.
133. Jim Harper, Understanding Regulators’ Warnings, BITCOIN FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 20,
2014), https://bitcoinfoundation.org/2014/03/20/understanding-regulators-warnings/.
134. But see Auroracoin, the virtual currency that has been created and promulgated by
the Icelandic government and distributed to its citizens. AURORACOIN, http://auroracoin.org/
(last visited July 2, 2014).
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regulate digital currencies as contracts of minute duration leads to elegant
and worthwhile consequences.
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Processing
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Fig. 5: Traditional Money Transmission Network
First, contract dispute between states and nations are relatively common
and the body of protections and remedies is straightforward. Copyright
protections are speculative and cannot be clearly envisioned at the time of
transfer. Tort remedies for theft and misuse of the Bitcoin are similarly
difficult to envision. If virtual currency is going to be used by legitimate
and risk-averse parties, the certainty and precognition available from
contract remedies are essential. This works both ways: the transferor/owner
will be able to predict future possible remedies from misuse or loss; and
this helps those who seek to take coins of uncertain origin: They understand
the absolute limits of their potential liability. The certainty for all
participants from a legal standpoint is essential if virtual currency is going
to be a respectable alternative to current transfers.
Another positive benefit to virtual currency existing in the form of
contract is the flexibility of such arrangements. It has proven remarkably
easy to create virtual currency modeled after Bitcoin. Each derivative
virtual currency has a unique reason for its existence and a unique chain of
transfers leading back to an initial source. But there is no reason these
currencies need to exist in perpetuity, and there is no reason the creation of
a new currency needs to lead to new regulatory structure simply because the
new currency features some option or feature that has not been anticipated
by the existing regulatory scheme. Consider for example a new Bitcoin
derivative, the GodloveCoin, which offers the feature of including call
options from various banks around the world. This feature would baffle a
regulator seeking to keep the market stable and free from illicit transactions
under any proposed Bitcoin scheme. But under future disputes in court,
considering the GodloveCoin in a contract litigation, the judge would
simply rely on existing precedent at the time of the creation of the contract
and apply the Bitcoin cases in an analogous manner.
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Fig. 6: Proposed Bank-Backed Virtual Currency Transmission Structure
Thus consider the Bitcoin and its progeny as forms of money
transmission through value-infused software IP rather than currency or
commodity. Contract allows the flourishing of virtual currency with as
many names and functions as there are different needs between interested
parties. The production of such coins has been shown to be easy, and future
production will become trivial. Such coins would exist until their purpose
has been exhausted, and the use of these, with the call option on various
banks, would allow the future Coins to be fully called once the transactions
have been wrapped up. The call option can exist as long as the banks with
which such Coins have been created in conjunction with exist.
2. What Features Future Virtual Currency Must Include
Messages can be embedded in the "coinbase" of a block. The Bitcoin
genesis block contains the headline from the front page of a newspaper and
subsequent user “Luke-Jr” used his Coin pool to embed Bible quotes and
prayers into the block chain. In this fashion, regulations should exist that
require certain information to be embedded in the block chain from the
initial creation of the Coin. Federal law should be enacted that requires
certain public statements to be embedded, which can be accessed by owners
of the Coins once they own possession. Embedded messages can be either
encrypted or unencrypted. A blanket requirement that certain information
be included in all virtual currencies created and transferred is the minimum
regulation that solves nearly all of the problems identified with virtual
currency.

2014]

REGULATORY OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY

41

Unencrypted messages should include the same kinds of disclosures that
are currently required for users to create money transfer accounts, as well as
some hybrid disclosures modeled on those required for initial public
offerings of securities.
At least one federal district court has found that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over cryptocurrency pursuant to sections 20 and 22 of the
Securities Act of 1933, and sections 21 and 27 of the Exchange Act of
1934. 135 The jurisdiction was created through the unique manner in which
the virtual currency at issue was endorsed and offered. The court correctly
determined that, in these circumstances, virtual currency can be sold as an
investment contract and is therefore under SEC jurisdiction:
The term "security" is defined as "any note, stock, treasury
stock, security future, security-based swap, bond ... [or]
investment contract ..."[136] An investment contract is any
contract, transaction, or scheme involving (1) an investment of
money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation that
profits will be derived from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party.[137] First, the Court must determine whether the BTCST
investments constitute an investment of money. It is clear that
Bitcoin can be used as money. It can be used to purchase goods
or services, and as Shavers stated, used to pay for individual
living expenses. The only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is
limited to those places that accept it as currency. However, it can
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S.
dollar, Euro, Yen, and Yuan. Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or
form of money, and investors wishing to invest in BTCST
provided an investment of money.
Next, the Court looks at whether there is a common
enterprise. To show a common enterprise, the Fifth Circuit
requires interdependence between the investors and the
promotor, which "may be demonstrated by the investors'
collective reliance on the promotor's expertise even where the
promotor receives only a flat fee or commission rather than a

135. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex.
filed Aug. 6, 2013).
136. Id. at *2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b).
137. Id. (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99
(1946)); Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 (1989).
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share in the profits of the venture." . . . .[138] That
interdependence is established in this case because the investors
here were dependent on Shavers' expertise in Bitcoin markets
and his local connections.[139] In addition, Shavers allegedly
promised a substantial return on their investments as a result of
his trading and exchanging Bitcoin. Therefore, the Court finds
that there is a common enterprise.
Finally, the Court considers whether there is an expectation
that profits will be derived from the efforts of the promotor or
third party. The Court finds that this prong is also met. At the
outset, Shavers allegedly promised up to 1% interest daily, and
at some point during the relevant period the interest promised
was at 3.9%. Clearly any investors participating in the BTCST
investments were expecting profits from the efforts of
Shavers. 140
From the three factors, it is clear that Bitcoins were being sold as
securities in this instance. In any future instances where cryptocurrencies
are sold in similar fashions, the SEC should indeed gain jurisdiction to
proceed. However, this is not a radical step. The SEC has jurisdiction over
sales of real estate, rental property, and cooperative ventures, if they are
sold in a form that resembles speculative contracts or other common
enterprises for profit. 141 But it should be clear from these factors that sale of
bitcoins do not usually fall within the definition of securities. Only when
virtual currency is created to facilitate a common speculative enterprise
should they be determined to be securities.
Consider why virtual currencies generally do not satisfy the three factors
that would create SEC jurisdiction. First, while the court above did consider
bitcoins to be currency, they are generally not considered so.142 Second, the
Bitcoin network, or other networks, typically constitute peer-to-peer
contracts between private parties in the settlement of some payment, and

138. Id. (quoting Long, 881 F.2d at 141).
139. Author’s note: Even when strict vertical commonality is required, contracts in the
nature of this case will satisfy the definition of a security. Looser commonality requirements
in other jurisdictions may be satisfied with arrangements that organize investors in less
dependent ways.
140. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182. at *2-3.
141. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
142. IRS Pub. Notice 2014-21 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-1421.pdf.
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form an exchange of limited duration which does not constitute a common
enterprise unless the sale is explicitly (or in some cases implicitly by virtue
of the promotor’s expertise) offered as part of one. Third, as this article
argues, virtual currency has very little inherent value. The fact that
speculators have latched onto virtual currency at this time as a commodity
does not make it so; Magic: the Gathering cards are not securities simply
because their price can fluctuate rapidly on the open market. Virtual
currencies are not inherently speculative; only when their value is tied to
some other concrete store of value, such as government currency or
traditional commodities (in the case at issue, oil), will they be considered
securities for jurisdictional purposes.
3. What Changes Are Needed to Buttress Existing State and Federal
Regulatory Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Allow Consumer Protection?
As discussed, the Securities and Exchange Commission currently has the
jurisdiction to investigate particularly egregious cases of speculative sale of
virtual currency. The IRS already has the jurisdiction to investigate the
gains and losses stemming from the ownership of virtual currency. And
courts have already disposed of civil cases between aggrieved parties on
virtual currency exchange networks. I would encourage lawmakers to limit
what legislation they consider proposing at this early stage, and require only
that newly created coins include encrypted information and disclosures.
That would go a long way to alleviate consumer protection worries: All
transferred virtual currency should include embedded messages should
include consumer disclosures and addresses of recourse.
A more radical proposal would be to require future virtual currencies to
be backed by some store of value. New Virtual Coins could only be created
by licensed money transmitters, and sold to the public as methods of
transferring ownership of the value they represent. Coins could be
prohibited from sale unless they contained information that could be used to
draw upon funds, either in a bank account or from the issuing body itself.
Messages encrypted into Bitcoins are in a hexadecimal nonce, not
plaintext embedded messages. They cannot be read unless the issuer and the
reader have some agreed-upon encoding independent of the chain itself.
With ASCII this is a trivial concern for those with the agreed-upon
encoding, but if anyone else downloads a block the text will be illegible.
How is this useful? All owners of the coin beyond the initial issuer
would have access to an encoded file within their GodloveCoin that they
could access but not read. This message would be a draw order (upon a
bank account, for example, or entitling the owner to an ounce of gold). If
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submitted to the bank, the bank would only be able to decode the file if the
decryption algorithm had been shared by the issuer. Anyone submitting the
order could be confirmed and the money could be withdrawn in real dollar
after the bank receives possession of the Coin and decrypts the order. This
would mean that the Coins have a terminal point: whenever an owner uses
them to “cash out” at the bank where the issuer created the account joined
to the Coin upon creation. Federal regulators should require this kind of
system to be used in the creation of coins; and seize those on the open
market that do not have these protections. This will proximately cause the
stabilization and permit adequate regulation of virtual currency.
D. When Should Regulators Enter?
1. Every Transaction, or at the Beginning and End of the Chain?
The central question is: What types of firms should be regulated; and
which transactions should draw agency involvement? The two general
answers are that regulators can either regulate each transfer of virtual
currency between owners, or merely regulate the beginning and end of the
chain. I believe that regulation can achieve all the desired functions by
regulating only the beginning and end of the chain except for institutional
owners, for reasons that follow below.
Why should regulators not enter during each transmission? First, it is
invasive. Police monitoring of each cash and debit transaction would be
considered undue involvement in the lives of citizens, and may implicate
federal Constitutional rights. Second, such involvement would be
expensive and burdensome, costing both government resources and stifling
innovation. Third, such regulatory involvement would be practicably
difficult to effectuate, more so than regulation of a single-point transaction
network, due to the peer-to-peer qualities of virtual currency.
Financial regulators would find it nearly impossible to provide oversight
for every single individual, peer-to-peer transaction unless there is evidence
of specific criminal or civil wrongdoing. Such instances would not need
regulatory oversight, and could be dealt with in the current court tort
system, or through specific causes of action to be discussed at a later date.
Miners are a vital part of the ecosystem, but regulators have determined
that they do not meet the threshold for proactive oversight. The US
Treasury’s FinCEN issued a release stating this fact: Miners and individual
investors do not merit oversight. 143 This is the first broad stroke in laying
down where regulation should begin, and is a positive step in keeping the
143. Treasury Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 3.
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regulation to a minimum. 144 We do not, for instance, require policing of
every single individual transaction involving cash. But should we, as some
suggest, only regulate transactions where virtual currencies are exchanged
for dollars and other traditional currencies? 145
Institutional investors, however, do merit increased oversight. Any
organization the offers itself as a virtual currency exchange, or operates as
one, or creates and offers a new virtual currency, should be required to
register in their state, and every state in which their customers operate, as
money transmission services. The laws governing money transmission
services vary by state, but all require some minimum level of capital
backing and consumer protections, as well as reporting requirements to
limit money laundering and illicit purchasing.
Without this minimum level of oversight virtual currency has a capacity
to scale up money laundering in a way that is not possible with physical
cash. Law enforcement is already aware of these issues and has expressed
concern. 146 The accelerating growth of virtual currencies in online and brick
and mortar transactions and illicit networks can leave a gaping loophole for
misconduct if this technology gains wider adoption. When it comes to using
physical cash for illegal activity, criminals are constrained in certain
respects to what they can physically carry and transport. There are no such
limitations when it comes to virtual currencies. If we adopt an end-point
terminal regulatory schema, and require institutions to monitor and report
suspicious transactions internally, we will have to be assured that it
reasonably limits money-laundering potential.
2. Preventing Money Laundering at the Termination of Virtual Currency
The United States Treasury Department recently enacted new rules to
regulate Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, making it subject to the same
level of scrutiny as other forms of currency. That’s bad news for anyone
looking to launder money using Bitcoin, but it could be good news for
proponents of virtual currency for legitimate purposes. Examples of
regulated activities “include, in part, (1) the transfer of funds between a
customer and a third party by permitting a third party to fund a customer’s
144. Id.
145. NYDFS Virtual Currency Hearing, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014_indx.htm.
146. Money Transmitter Div., Cal. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., Developments and Issues in MSB
Supervision (Aug. 25, 2011) (graphics presentation at a 2011 Conference of State Bank
Supervisors Legal Seminar), available at http://www.csbs.org/development/Documents/MSB
SupervisionVenchiarutti.pdf.
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account; (2) the transfer of value from a customer’s currency or commodity
position to the account of another customer; or (3) the closing out of a
customer’s currency or commodity position, with a transfer of proceeds to a
third party. Since the definition of a money transmitter does not
differentiate between real currencies and convertible virtual currencies, the
same rules apply to brokers and dealers of e-currency and e-precious
metals. 147 Typically, this involves the broker or dealer electronically
distributing digital certificates of ownership of real currencies or precious
metals, with the digital certificate being the virtual currency. However, the
same conclusions would apply in the case of the broker or dealer issuing
paper ownership certificates or manifesting customer ownership or control
of real currencies or commodities in an account statement or any other
form. These conclusions would also apply in the case of a broker or dealer
in commodities other than real currencies or precious metals. A broker or
dealer of e-currencies or e-precious metals that engages in money
transmission could be either an administrator or exchanger depending on its
business model. 148
The Treasury rules treat Bitcoin and its ilk regulated in a similar fashion
to how the government deals with traditional money-order services like
Western Union. 149 Individuals trading in Bitcoins need not concern
themselves with reporting requirements, but businesses dealing with them,
such as exchanges, will be required to keep more detailed records of the
transactions. Transactions over $10,000 must be reported.150 A user of
virtual currency is not an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations and therefore is
not subject to MSB registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations.
However, an administrator or exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s
regulations, specifically, a money transmitter, unless a limitation to or
exemption from the definition applies to the person.151 An administrator or

147. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, Guidance: Application of
the Definition of Money Transmitter to Brokers and Dealers in Currency and Other
Commodities, FINCEN (No. FIN-2008-G008, Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.fincen.gov/
statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/fin-2008-g008.pdf. The guidance also notes that the definition of
money transmitter excludes any person, such as a futures commission merchant, that is
“registered with, and regulated or examined by . . . the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.” Id.
148. Treasury Guidance FIN-2013-G001, supra note 3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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exchanger is not a provider or seller of prepaid access, or a dealer in foreign
exchange, under FinCEN’s regulations. 152
Transfer of virtual currency into cash needs to be regulated, as well.
Virtual currency purchases for consumer goods do not need to be
investigated; it would be impractical for money launderers to purchase
thousands of model train sets with dirty money. At the point in the chain
where virtual currency is traded for readily-seized value, regulators need to
be ready to enter. This end-of-chain transaction is where regulators should
spend most of their time, and lawmakers should consider imposing strict
requirements. This is the most important step of the chain because easy-totransfer-but-difficult-to-spend virtual currency is converted into difficult-totransfer-but-easy-to-spend gold or cash.
As a bare minimum, legislators should require that virtual currency
cannot be converted into cash or gold except at banks or other licensed
financial institutions. A more strict regulation (which I endorse) would
prevent Bitcoins from being converted to cash or gold entirely, unless they
are transferred to their creator’s bank. In such regime, all virtual currency
would need to be created in connection with an originating bank, and
embedded text in the Coins would tell owners at which bank the Coin may
be “cashed out;” owners who wish to convert their Coins would transfer
ownership to the bank, after which the bank would verify the Coin and
release the funds to the owner. Banks would be required to report
suspicious transactions, as detailed below.
3. Taxation
Bitcoins also pose regulatory difficulty to the income tax code. How
should they be taxed? Again, a regulatory schema that limits itself to the
start and end points of coins would be superior, as it would fit seamlessly
into the federal tax regime. "Bitcoin is not a currency," despite the
protestations of some supporters, and “[u]sers of Bitcoin should not think
that it is exempt from taxation or outside the tax system. There's nothing
that Bitcoin allows anyone to do that they can't already do in the regular
banking system ... Libertarians, drug dealers, and tinfoil hatters like Bitcoin
because it is not issued by a central government, but the irony is that it is
more controllable and more traceable than the U.S. bank notes . . . .” 153
The only true cases on point comes from Barter Systems, a company that
allowed customers to trade in hard assets in return for "trade units" issued
152. Id.
153. Lee Shepard predicted the IRS response in a Tax Notes article several weeks before
the IRS Publication laying out IRS treatment of Bitcoins.
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by the firm. The U.S. tax court ruled that Barter Systems was required to
report transactions involving these trade units and that the exchange should
be taxed on the fair market value of property received in exchange for trade
units. 154 According to Tax Attorney Lee Sheppard, “Bitcoin is analogous to
the trade units considered in Barter Systems Inc. of Wichita. It is a privately
issued medium of exchange accepted only in constrained circumstances and
not backed by any promise of the issuer. Colvin treated the trade units as
property in analyzing their use. The same analysis applies to Bitcoin.” 155
And indeed the IRS later confirmed that for federal tax purposes, virtual
currency is treated as property.
General tax principles applicable to property transactions apply to
transactions using virtual currency. The basis of virtual currency that a
taxpayer receives as payment for goods or services is the fair market value
of the virtual currency in U.S. dollars as of the date of receipt. 156 One who
purchases ten BTC for $100 will receive ten bitcoins each with a $10 basis.
For sale of virtual currency for U.S. tax purposes, transactions must be
reported in U.S. dollars. Therefore, taxpayers will be required to determine
the fair market value of virtual currency in U.S. dollars as of the date of
payment or receipt. If a virtual currency is listed on an exchange and the
exchange rate is established by market supply and demand, the fair market
value of the virtual currency is determined by converting the virtual
currency into U.S. dollars (or into another real currency which in turn can
be converted into U.S. dollars) at the exchange rate, in a reasonable manner
that is consistently applied.
If the fair market value of property received in exchange for virtual
currency exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis of the virtual currency, the
taxpayer has taxable gain. The taxpayer has a loss if the fair market value of
the property received is less than the adjusted basis of the virtual currency.
The character of the gain or loss generally depends on whether the
virtual currency is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. A taxpayer
generally realizes capital gain or loss on the sale or exchange of virtual
currency that is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. For example,
stocks, bonds, and other investment property are generally capital assets. A
taxpayer generally realizes ordinary gain or loss on the sale or exchange of
virtual currency that is not a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.

154. Barter Sys., Inc. of Wichita v. Comm’r, 1990 T.C. Memo 125 (T.C. 1990).
155. Lee A. Sheppard, Busting the Bitcoin Myths, 142 TAX NOTES 896 (Mar. 3, 2014).
156. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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Inventory and other property held mainly for sale to customers in a trade or
business are examples of property that is not a capital asset. 157
A payment made using virtual currency is subject to information
reporting to the same extent as any other payment made in property. For
example, a person who in the course of a trade or business makes a
payment of fixed and determinable income using virtual currency with a
value of $600 or more to a U.S. non-exempt recipient in a taxable year is
required to report the payment to the IRS and to the payee. 158 Examples of
payments of fixed and determinable income include rent, salaries, wages,
premiums, annuities, and compensation.
Generally, a person who in the course of a trade or business makes a
payment of $600 or more in a taxable year to an independent contractor for
the performance of services is required to report that payment to the IRS
and to the payee on Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income. 159 Payments
of virtual currency required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC should be
reported using the fair market value of the virtual currency in U.S. dollars
as of the date of payment.
Generally, a person who in the course of a trade or business makes a
payment of $600 or more in a taxable year to an independent contractor for
the performance of services is required to report that payment to the IRS
and to the payee on Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income. Payments of
virtual currency required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC should be
reported using the fair market value of the virtual currency in U.S. dollars
as of the date of payment. The payment recipient may have income even if
the recipient does not receive a Form 1099-MISC. See the Instructions to
Form 1099-MISC and the General Instructions for Certain Information
Returns for more information. For payments to non-U.S. persons, see
Publication 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign
Entities.
These IRS regulations are not surprising considering that for tax
purposes, gross income is defined as “income from whatever source
derived.” 160 Barter of goods and services count as taxable income so a
virtual currency should also be considered as such, and not a currency

157. See IRS Pub. Notice 2014-21 (Apr. 14, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/
2014-16_IRB/ar12.html, for more information about capital assets and the character of gain
or loss.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2012).
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(considering the fluctuations in price inherent in the virtual currency
network).
The IRS ruling does, however, pose problems for Bitcoin miners. Those
who mined hundreds of Coins when the value of bitcoins was $300 and
sold them when the exchanges were valuing BTC at over $1,000 have
realized taxable gain of several hundred dollars per Coin.161 Those who
mined bitcoins when the fair market value for each Coin exceeded $1,000
and fell to less than $500 have a good amount of capital losses they may
claim. It may behoove the IRS to consider further limitations to capital
gains and losses on virtual currency, lest a future article detail methods by
which unscrupulous traders may generate large paper losses with virtual
currency in order to deduct from their taxes.
E. How Future Regulations Will Begin to Work in Practice
1. Which Laws Need to Be enacted at the Minimum
Ideally, all virtual currency, such as Bitcoin and its derivative variants,
will be required to include plaintext consumer disclosures in plaintext as
riders attached to each file. Furthermore, any new derivative coin created
from now on must include encrypted messages in each Coin in the Genesis
block with a withdrawal order at a specific bank where the creator operates
an account. The private key unlocking the message would be shared with
the bank by the creator, and any subsequent owner of the Coin would thus
be enabled to transfer ownership of the Coin to the bank and receive cash
transferred from the account. If I wanted to create a new Coin and call it
GodloveCoins, I would need to be a licensed money transmitter 162 with a
bank account containing sufficient funds, communicate my private key to
the bank, and let the account wait in trust for ownership of the
GodloveCoin. Creating and owning the GodloveCoin Genesis block, I
could now transmit ownership to the bank from anywhere in the world and
receive access to the proportionate funds. Or, if I transferred them to a new
owner, that owner and any subsequent owner down the block chain, could
“cash in” the GodloveCoin with my bank.
An obvious point about GodloveCoin concept is that it limits the amount
of new regulatory structure government needed to prevent virtual money
161. However, the IRS has permitted those in extraordinary circumstances to explain
their reason for failing to pay taxes on their Bitcoin gains in 2013/2014.
162. Because “a person that creates units of convertible virtual currency and sells those
units to another person for real currency or its equivalent is engaged in transmission to
another location and is a money transmitter,” creators of virtual currency must be registered
as money transmitters.
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laundering and protect consumers of virtual currency. The least possible
change to existing framework needs to be done, which should make privacy
advocates, limited government advocates, and ‘Net libertarians happy.
Resolution of disputes between parties has been discussed above.
Government notification in the GodloveCoin scheme happens only in the
case of irregular banking withdrawals of cash or suspicious transfers at
online currency exchanges. GodloveCoins could theoretically be traded
across the entire globe time and time again without triggering any flags if
they are traded legitimately. In such a case, the public ledger would be
saved and recorded by law enforcement but not used to track transactions or
decrypted to identify owners. Users would act in a relatively unrestricted
environment, using petty amounts of GodloveCoin as cash, changing hands
and transferring the options to draw upon the cash in the account, or sell
ownership of the Coin itself. It is also probable that banks would become
the primary organizations conducting the ‘mining’ required to resolve
transfers, which will keep their transfers safe and secure the network
against concentrated malicious hackers. 163 Banking regulatory schemes
would come into play only when the coins were drawn upon. In such a case,
the Coins would be turned into real cash. At this point, standard banking
regulations trigger. Transmissions would only be regulated in the creation
and centralized exchanging of virtual currency.
2. The GodloveCoin in the Proposed Regulatory Scheme
Let’s take a hypothetical example. The Godlove Corporation in
California, USA wants to buy a thousand widgets from Manufacturing Ltd.
in New York. Manufacturing Ltd. buys its raw material from Oil Inc. in
Oman. And Oil Inc. has a banking account in New York State. Godlove
Corp. creates a million GodloveCoins for the purchase of the widgets.
Godlove Corp. has accounts in a California bank with some established
minimum amount, in this case $1M. The created Coins are all tied to the
account, and each GodloveCoin contains encrypted code entitling the owner
to draw of one dollar from the account. The private keys used to encode the
message are transmitted to the bank. The GodloveCoins are all transferred
to Manufacturing Corp. Manufacturing Corp., intending to buy some raw
materials to begin the order, “cashes in” half the coins by transferring
ownership to the bank. The hash numbers are sent to the bank, where they
are decrypted into valid draw orders with the secret key. Manufacturing
Corp. withdraws half a million dollars from the local bank and has them
163. This would solve the 51% Miner attack problem.
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transferred to their bank. The other half of the GodloveCoins are transferred
to Oil Inc. in Oman in order to buy raw materials. Oil Inc. receives the new
hash numbers, which are verified on the public block chain, and
immediately transfers the Coins to its subsidiary corporation in California.
In California, the GodloveCoins are resolved as above and the funds are
withdrawn. Now that all of the Coins have been transferred to the bank, and
the account is empty, the bank’s fiduciary duty to preserve the private key
and manage a private wallet for the Coins ends and the data can be
destroyed. The ability to draw in New York on a purchase made in
California is old news, but here has been done in a more efficient, quicker,
and less costly fashion. Godlove Corps.’ bank in California will make a
payment to Oil’s bank in Oman, perhaps with an EFT. If there are any
suspicious indicia, they will be revealed to the bank now and reported to the
proper authorities. The GodloveCoin, created for a particular purchasing
arrangement, is now worthless and trading among further parties, whether
authorized or not, will be pointless. Any future transfers will be rejected, as
the checksum will not validate.
The advantages are numerous: no money has been lost to currency
exchange: The half-million dollars drawn from New York have the same
value as the half-million sent from California. Additionally, the records of
exchange are public and the identities of the transferees, if known to the
participants, can be easily traced and deduced, but would be much more
difficult for outsiders to link or determine the identities of the participants.
From the standpoint of the federal government, such transfers are
acceptable because money laundering and banking notification
requirements are triggered.
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) have become the primary source of
information from financial institutions and other reporting sources (casinos,
currency exchanges, etc.) to assist in anti-money laundering efforts. SARs
increased from 52,000 in 1996 to 288,000 in 2003. 164 Nearly half of these
were characterized as “violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) /
Structuring / Money Laundering.” 165 Law enforcement officials consider
SARs more useful and informative in the identification of suspicious
activity than many other sources. Additionally, there are examples of
money laundering being discovered by small banks that failed to file SARs.
Great Eastern Bank of Florida, with deposits of $55 million failed to alert

164. PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CHASING DIRTY
MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 108 (2004).
165. Id.
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authorities of the structured deposits of some customers. FinCEN
investigated and determined willful violations based on the lack of
reporting or vague details when SARs were filed. 166 Virtual Currency
exchanges, and banks that “cash in” virtual currency will be under reporting
requirements, which will include reporting of customers who appear to be
involved in money laundering or structuring.
If the block transfer looks suspicious, investigators will have the option
of requesting further information and looking at the investigation. The
origin of the Coins will be obvious and regulators will be able to request
information from the creator of the coins. Regulators will also be able to see
the record of transfers and, while the identities of the block-chain recipients
will be anonymous (initially), any suspicious transfers will become
immediately apparent. Thus, the ability to determine if money laundering,
tax evasion, or purchase of illicit goods will be inherent in the system, with
reporting requirements similar to the current financial scheme, while
permitting innovation, freedom, and limiting of costs that offer so much
promise in the emerging realm of virtual currency.
3. How Proposed Virtual Currency Would Assist International
Purchases
What about governments that restrict virtual currency to cash
transactions? China, for example, has chosen to limit the use of Bitcoins to
Yuan exchanges. It was really no surprise given China’s stringent capital
controls. 167 But the move was interesting in the context of China’s recent
history. QQ Messenger, the most popular messaging application in China
with currently 800 million users, at one time embedded its own virtual
currency (“QQ coin”). In 2009, the PBOC issued guidance that said it was
illegal to trade QQ coin for fear that it was being used for illicit purposes.
Conversely, the PBOC issued guidance that Bitcoin may be traded by
private persons, but traditional financial institutions and third-party
payment processors may not deal with virtual currency.
China maintains a tight control of the Yuan, and officials recognize that
virtual currencies may be used as arbitrage tools against the currency. It is
166. Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In re Great E. Bank of Fla., No. 2002-02 (Fin.
Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the Treasury Sept. 4, 2002), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/geassessfinal.pdf
167. To see an example of the intellectual contortions that such stringent regimes
engender, such as an argument that virtual currency is distinct from virtual coinage, see Sun
Guang-zhi, Study on Virtual Currency, 11 TECHNOLOGICAL DEV. ENTERPRISE 30 (2006)
(published in Beijing, China).
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unlikely that virtual currency will ever been permitted to exchange into
Yuan, unless Chinese international policy dramatically shifts. However,
there is no reason that U.S.-bank-backed virtual currencies may not be used
by individuals in China before transfer back to U.S. firms. Such currencies
could in fact find several favorable niches in the Chinese market.
4. How Proposed Virtual Currency Would Prevent Theft
Let us imagine, then, a scenario similar to the hypothetical example
above, except that this time an international firm steals the GodloveCoins.
A criminal syndicate in Russia that seeks to use the virtual currency to
launder money now owns half of the Coins. The first problem the syndicate
faces is that the coins are tied to known bank accounts in America. Once
the theft is reported, the accounts can be closed or watched for draw orders.
Payment between Manufacturing Ltd. and Oil Inc. has not been completed,
and the parties, aware that the account is now frozen to Coin withdrawals,
may arrange alternative payment (an EFT, for example). Even if the
criminal syndicate attempts to use the Coins to draw upon the accounts
before the parties have been alerted to the theft, an inspection of the public
ledger by the bank should indicate the unusual provenance of the Coins.
This will, of course, trigger banking reporting requirements. Large transfers
between accounts will be tracked, as in the normal course of business.
Attempts to withdraw money may signal to law enforcement that they
should investigate, whereupon it is a trivial matter to backtrack the public
chain of transfers from the bank account to the initial release. Again, this is
public information which makes it much quicker and easier to access for
law enforcement than traditional bank records across the globe, and
methods of decrypting the anonymity will make indexing such transfers
fairly trivial.
The only downside to this proposed regime would be in the use of greymarket virtual currency: Currency tied to secret bank accounts in countries
with above-average banking privacy laws; or coins created to foil attempts
to decrypt the identities of transferors such as those that are automatically
routed through botnets. The trade-off of such proposed grey-market
currency would be a decreased trust by the parties using them. Such
denominations would necessarily be small, and their fair market value,
would either be substantially lower than the amount to be called upon from
the bank account, limiting the competitive advantage from such coins
compared to traditional forms of money laundering; or, if decoupled from
the actual accounts, meaning the entire value of the currency would be
retained in the form of speculative investment, and for such currency, the
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only value that could be extracted from such Coins would be in the form of
illicit goods, such as laundered petty cash, drugs, etc.
V. What Needs to Be Addressed
Clearly, the future of virtual currency is exciting and difficult to predict.
But by determining probable future developments, and gently prodding the
developers of these products toward development in the areas outlined
above, I predict a stable and useful product may result. Such currency
would enjoy significant cost and time-savings over current methods of
purchase and payment over the internet, which is a vitally needed
development in the increasingly globalized world. And, given the outlines
above, government regulation would not stifle such development. 168 In fact,
certain enjoyable legal protections would be extended to virtual currency,
offering the kind of legitimate backing and protections that can lead to
widespread adoption by the general community. Here are specific proposals
for applying existing rules for money transmitters or banks, which have
generally served consumers well when vigorously enforced. Indeed, certain
aspects of virtual currency could dovetail with existing regulations. That
said, our agency will likely have to proceed with issuing some form of
specially tailored BitLicense that adapts those rules to the world of virtual
currency.
A. Consumer Education, Protection, and Disclosures
1. The Need for Disclosures
Consumers should be aware that many virtual currencies do not provide
for chargebacks. Disclosures encoded in the plaintext of virtual currency, or
the website operated by the creator, should clearly tell consumers that
transactions are, for the most part, irreversible. In other words, there is
generally no “money back guarantees” for crypto-currencies. 169 Such
guarantees would need to come from reputable businesses in jurisdictions
where traditional consumer lawsuits are routine in order for consumers to
feel secure relying them.
Consumers should also be warned about the importance of keeping their
“private keys” private – as well as the potential consequences if they fail to
168. Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, How Best to Guide the Evolution of
Electronic Currency Law; 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1105 (1996-1997).
169. But see Ethan E. White, Massively Multiplayer Online Fraud: Why the Introduction
of Real World Law in a Virtual Context Is Good for Everyone; 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 228 (2007-2008).
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do so. Given the irreversibility of most transactions, if a consumer has their
private key stolen, they could easily lose their virtual currency irretrievably.
The legal notice issued by Flexcoin should be examined as an inadequate
disclosure, which should fall under the legal minimum for future
standards. 170
Moreover, consumers should be informed about the documented
volatility of virtual currency and the potential for loss of dollardenominated principal if they hold onto that virtual currency for an
extended period of time. Because virtual currencies can be so easily traded,
creators should be aware that their products will rarely be limited to
sophisticated investors. Like mutual funds or retirement plans, the
obligation rests on the seller to ensure that consumers understand the nature
of these financial instruments.
If the United States intends to promote itself as the central location in
which virtual currency can be bought, sold, and invested upon, it must first
ensure that average consumers are provided with strong, clear, concise
disclosures, just as it has in the securities and banking realms.
How should these disclosures be made? Unlike Paypal or credit card
providers (where a central authority controls the payments and acts as the
intermediary between parties), there is by definition no intermediary in
virtual currency. Users do not need to sign a contract with their terms and
conditions, including disclosures, in order to receive coins. And, in the
wake of increasingly flourishing variants of the Bitcoin as alternative
virtual currency, there is no single easily recognized authority from which
disclosures could be made.
2. Virtual Currency Disclosures
The largest burden to make initial disclosures to consumers should be on
the initial creator of the virtual currency. In the initial public offering (even
if the entirety of the currency is immediately transferred to a single source),
the currency will need to be bundled with a short plaintext disclosure
directing any owner to a website containing the public disclosures. This
page would need to be maintained by the creator of the Coin for the
duration of the Coin’s life, until such time as the accounts are tapped and
the Coins expire. This will lead to a form of continuing liability for the

170. “Legal Notice: We are not a true bank that accepts USD or any national currency,
only bitcoins which by their nature are not regulated, we’re not FDIC insured or regulated by
any government entity.” Note that Flexcoin closed its doors after reporting the loss of
millions of dollars from its online virtual currency wallets.
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creator of Coins, and would lessen the incentive to create coins for any but
large institutions.
A second way disclosures could be made would to bundle the plaintext
disclosures with each Coin; a checksum would make altering the plaintext
difficult, as the Coins would not authenticate on transfer if the public
disclosures have been altered. The downsides are technical: This would
increase the size of each transfer, and would potentially make the
encryption of the cyphertext less secure. It would also make it impossible to
change the public disclosure for the life of the Coin; neither the owner nor
the initial creator could alter these disclosures without rendering the Coin
unable to transfer (as, being altered, the Coins would not authenticate on
transfer).
Other places public disclosures could be made are in the transfers
themselves. This would have the advantage of limiting liability for the
creator of the Coin to the initial transfer only without leaving a trail of
continuing liability and necessity to monitor and update disclosures of
created Coins. Disclosures could be done automatically, if regulators
required any front-end software to make such warnings during
transmission. This would be a ‘click-through’ contract of the type that
consumers never read while updating iTunes or installing Photoshop. Most
of the home-brewed Bitcoin software is currently woefully programmed
and would not meet standards of consumer safety if sold retail. It would be
the place of some “killer-app” or possibly website that would corner the
market on exchanges and included click-through disclosures on transfer to
make such a form of consumer protection viable. It is possible that
regulatory structure could require new exchange software to include certain
mandated disclosures that end-users would see upon installation or use of
the software.
The last potential form of consumer disclosure would be on an ad-hoc
basis between parties of a transfer. If Coins were limited mainly to large
institutional users (as anticipated in the GodloveCoin hypotheticals), the
parties could be relied upon to negotiate disclosures and apportionment of
liabilities between themselves without regulation. Such disclosures would
rapidly converge on commonly used boilerplate, and variations of these
contracts could become commonly copied for use among less sophisticated
consumers or investors. If large institutions do begin to adopt virtual
currency, regulatory agencies would be well-served by adopting a wait-andsee attitude to allow private parties to experiment and determine where
apportionment of liability should lie, and what disclosures are offered or
sought.
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Until more development occurs, it would be premature to seek to name
the kinds of disclosures consumers would need in the use of virtual
currency. General outlines can be named, but the devil’s in the details. At
the very least, standard disclosures made by more traditional e-payment
methods that could not be made for virtual currency can be listed here, and
their implications laid out. First, the avoidance of ACH or other clearing
houses during payment mean consumers cannot count on suspicious
transfers being caught before they are made. Consumers’ coins that are
available online are insecure, and this dovetails into the second major
disclosure that consumers cannot be expected to find: there are no
chargebacks, no refunds, and no returns possible for stolen digital
currencies. Consumers need to be aware that their currency is as
untraceable as cash and as insecure as their email. This is the price of
pseudo-anonymous, easily transferable block-cypher virtual currency. This
is an inextricable fact of the currency; and attempts to provide consumer
protection would eliminate many of the aspects of virtual currency that
make it desirable in the first place.
Just as credit card companies protects their customers from fraud and
assume the risk for fraudulent use of credit card accounts, there could be
large institutions that assume the liability for use of Coins. Such companies
would keep the Coins in their own accounts and credit consumers with
Coins but keep them and make largely paper trades, except to trusted
outsiders. These virtual currency exchanges would (as discussed above) be
required to register as money transmitters and held by the Treasury to antimoney laundering requirements, but would assume the additional
responsibilities of ensuring that purchases made from certain trusted
sources included agreed-upon consumer protections. Users of the Coins
who made purchases from trusted sites and used Coins held for them by an
exchange could enjoy the same guarantees and return policies as consumers
in large retail stores.
B. Protection from Theft, Prevention of Illicit Purchase
1. Can Consumers Waive Liability Against Unauthorized Transfer?
One of the biggest questions with virtual currency exchanges is whether
they will insure against unauthorized transfers. An "Unauthorized
Transaction" is a type of error that occurs when money is sent from the
customer’s account that they did not authorize and that they do not benefit
from. An obvious example of unauthorized transaction would be a hacker
who steals a customer’s password, and uses the password to access and
initial a virtual currency transfer, possibly from a currency exchange site.
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However, it is standard policy that anyone entrusted with password access
to a Coin by that Coin’s owner may use that Coin as an agent of the owner,
and that a currency exchange would not consider transfers made to be
unauthorized, even if they did not benefit the owner. 171
2. Currency Exchange Protections Against Unauthorized Transfer
PayPal, the most successful online money transmission service, protects
its users against "Other Errors" that occur when money is either incorrectly
taken from customer accounts and when transactions are incorrectly
recorded in their accounts. PayPal protects customers when: sent payments
are incorrectly debited from their account; an incorrect amount is credited
to a customer’s account; if a transaction is missing from or not properly
identified in the account statement; the customer receives an incorrect
amount of money at an ATM; and if there is a computational or
mathematical error by PayPal. PayPal further provides that its customers
authorize PayPal to handle all disputes, claims, chargebacks, and reversals
as set forth in the User Agreement. Because PayPal is a centralized money
transmission service, such an agreement makes sense for it.
The unauthorized transaction protection is most likely to be the point on
which consumers and exchanges differ. Bitcoins are unlike other methods
of payment in their ability to be rapidly transferred and difficult to trace,
which makes chargebacks impossible. Thus, stolen Bitcoins (any
transferred without owner or trustee authorization) are gone. Who should
risk this loss? Bitcoins have been stolen through two major security
breaches thus far: poor security in the front-end and poor password
protection by the owners. When Bitcoins are kept in trust on an exchange
and stolen because of lax or poor site security, the exchange should clearly
be liable for the loss. And for Bitcoins held locally on owner’s computers
and stolen because of poor password protection or one of several methods
of unauthorized entry on the computer and transfer, the owner who left the
security hole on their own computers should bear the risk (they left the door
‘unlocked’ and are responsible for their own theft. But what about Bitcoins
left in trust on an exchange that are lost due to the owner’s poor choice in
password, or by publicly revealing their password? In such cases, the
exchange should still be held liable by default, unless the users of the
exchange have agreed previously to accept responsibility for the loss or
theft of their Coins due to poor password protocol. This is likely to become

171. See PayPal User Agreement, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/
ua/useragreement-full (last visited July 2, 2014). This is general agency law.
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a standard term of use for future exchanges, and will shift the burden of
liability to the person most “responsible” for the security hole that allowed
the unauthorized transfer. This is another reason to disallow exchanges that
do not have significant reserves, like registered money transmitters.
3. Arbitration Clauses
It seems likely to me that future Coins will include arbitration clauses in
their plaintext. Arbitration by the acceptance of a ticket is permitted,172 so
acceptance of a Coin likely includes agreement to the arbitration clauses
contained therein. This could be used to save money or be used against the
consumers in disputes.
The Federal Arbitration Act requires that federal substantive law applies
when the arbitration agreement is connected to a transaction involving
interstate commerce. 173 Whether the arbitration agreement is connected to a
transaction involving interstate commerce is a factual determination in each
case. 174 Under the FAA, on the motion of a party, a court must stay
proceedings and order the parties to arbitrate the dispute if the court finds
that the parties have agreed in writing to do so.175 A party seeking to
compel arbitration must show (1) that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists
between the parties and (2) that the specific dispute falls within the scope of
the agreement. 176
Arbitration clauses may be avoided if their application would be
unconscionable. Under California law, unconscionability has both
procedural and substantive components.177 The procedural component can
be satisfied by showing (1) oppression through the existence of unequal
bargaining positions or (2) surprise through hidden terms common in the
context of adhesion contracts. 178 The substantive component can be
172. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
173. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710, 713 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000);
Marciano v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (Robreno, J.);
see also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3569, at 173 (2d ed. 1984) ("[I]n a diversity suit . . . , the
substantive rules contained in the [Federal Arbitration] Act, based as it is on the commerce
and admiralty powers, are to be applied regardless of state law.").
174. State Farm, 233 F.3d at 713 n.1.
175. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 6. (2012).
176. Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 532 (3d Cir. 2005);
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990).
177. Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2007); Comb v.
PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
178. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
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satisfied by showing overly harsh or one-sided results that "shock the
conscience." 179 The two elements operate on a sliding scale such that the
more significant one is, the less significant the other need be.180 However, a
claim of unconscionability cannot be determined merely by examining the
face of the contract; there must be an inquiry into the circumstances under
which the contract was executed, and the contract's purpose, and effect.181
Typical cryptocurrency arbitration clauses, if they become popular, will
fall under the guidance of Comb v. PayPal. 182 Arbitration clauses will only
be binding if included in the original Genesis block of the Coin. Those who
attempt to attach arbitration clauses to their Coins on resale, after their
initial creation, will be changing the terms of the agreement upon which the
Coins were created, and courts will be correct to reject such arbitration
clauses. 183 Even if such clauses are included at the creation of the virtual
currency, they will be unconscionable adhesion contracts (and thus
correctly rejected by courts) unless the party seeking arbitration shows that
the purchaser was a sophisticated user in a competitive market for their
Coins. 184
However, even if instant agreement is procedurally unconscionable, it
may nonetheless be enforceable if the substantive terms are reasonable. 185
For instance, adhesion contracts on Coins should be mutual, which means
neither the buyer and seller should enjoy an unfair advantage in the choice
of arbitration over the other. 186 Arbitration clauses should specify the fees
and relative position of the parties in arbitration so that an unknown and
unidentified risk of excessive fees will not be sufficient to defeat a valid
arbitration clause.187

179. Id.
180. Id.; see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare, 6 P.3d 669 (2000) ("[T]he
more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and
vice versa.").
181. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1171.
184. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 769 (Ct. App.
1989).
185. See Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 416, 422-23 (Ct. App. 2000)
(finding contract of adhesion to arbitrate disputes enforceable).
186. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75; Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519,
1536 (Ct. App. 1997).
187. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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4. Illicit Purchase
What about the use of Coins in illicit purchases? We should look at the
ways that current Internet money transmitters restrict users’ ability to
purchase illicit goods. The PayPal user terms of service prohibits activities
that:
(1) violate any law, statute, ordinance or regulation, (2) relate to
transactions involving (a) narcotics, steroids, certain controlled
substances or other products that present a risk to consumer
safety, (b) drug paraphernalia, (c) items that encourage, promote,
facilitate or instruct others to engage in illegal activity, (d) stolen
goods including digital and virtual goods (e) items that promote
hate, violence, racial intolerance, or the financial exploitation of
a crime, (f) items that are considered obscene, (g) items that
infringe or violate any copyright, trademark, right of publicity or
privacy or any other proprietary right under the laws of any
jurisdiction, (h) certain sexually oriented materials or services,
(i) ammunition, firearms, or certain firearm parts or accessories,
or (j) ,certain weapons or knives regulated under applicable law,
(3) relate to transactions that (a) show the personal information
of third parties in violation of applicable law, (b) support
pyramid or Ponzi schemes, matrix programs, other "get rich
quick" schemes or certain multi-level marketing programs, . . .
(d) are for the sale of certain items before the seller has control
or possession of the item, (e) are by payment processors to
collect payments on behalf of merchants, (f), . . . (4) involve the
sales of products or services identified by government agencies
to have a high likelihood of being fraudulent. violate applicable
laws or industry regulations regarding the sale of (a) tobacco
products, or (b) prescription drugs and devices. 188
Paypal also prevents its use in connection with gambling or lottery sales,
although the use of virtual currency in gambling should be restricted
already though preexisting federal and state laws.189
These restrictions are important but largely unenforceable in virtual
currency. The difference is that, for virtual currency, there is no central
clearing house that could easily identify and prevent the transmission of
188. PayPal Acceptable Use Policy, PAYPAL, https://cms.paypal.com/c2/cgi-bin/?cmd=_
render-content& content_ID=ua/AcceptableUse_full (last visited July 9, 2014).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).
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money to illegal goods. Again, the burden would for the most part lies with
the escrow houses; but in peer-to-peer transmission, all escrow is bypassed.
The only realistic burden is the increased risk of theft or fraud, for which
the consumer who bypassed the safety of an escrow house would have no
recourse. Additionally, such restrictions would be overly burdensome on
the use of virtual currency, and such stipulations as restricting payment
before the possession has control or possession of the item being sold
would severely restrict their functionality.
It would be far better for such restrictions to be determined by the
creators of virtual currency and embedded in the public disclosures. It
would then fall to the owner’s responsibility to check the terms of service
and use the virtual currency only as the terms provide. Such restrictions
would be largely unenforceable but consumer protections and law
enforcement could be better served by focusing on other methods.
C. Safety and Soundness Requirements
1. Should Exchanges Hold Reserves and How
The capital, collateral, net worth, and investment requirements of virtual
currency are currently under debate. Who should retain sufficient capital
and collateral to secure end users against loss and theft? The Bitcoin
exchanges that currently exist have no capital reserves, and simply deduct
losses from theft, fraud, and embezzlement from their users’ accounts. Such
practices are damaging to consumer confidence and likely criminal. But
should these exchanges, acting like money transmission services, be bound
to reimburse users for their losses? How? Should end-users or issuers be
required to maintain collateral or capital reserves upon which their virtual
currency can be drawn?
Traditional money transmitters and banks have to abide by certain net
worth and permissible investment requirements to help ensure that they are
operating in a safe and sound manner. They, for example, need to have a
large enough capital buffers on their balance sheets to absorb unexpected
losses and financial shocks without going under. They are also limited in
the types of investments they can hold – so they are not taking reckless
risks with customer money in the search of windfall profits.
Virtual currency exchange firms should be required to abide by similar
requirements. However, regulators need to restructure the rules in light of
the fact that the virtual currencies these firms hold are not denominated in
dollars or other forms of traditional currency. Coins held in trust, if lost,
must be replaced by Coins held by the firm, not taken from the consumers’
accounts. This much is obvious. But what if replacement Coins cannot be
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found, or the theft bankrupts the company? What monetary replacements
should be made, and how should the values be determined? If Coins are
legally barred from being exchanged for cash, how will consumers be
compensated for their losses? The issue is further complicated by the fact
that the value of virtual currencies relative to traditional currencies can
fluctuate significantly on a day-by-day or even hour-by-hour basis. The
simple answer is that GodloveCoins, or any coins that are based upon a
stable unit of value such as gold or corporate stock, will make such
valuations trivially easy. Buyers and regulators will find themselves
laboring to calculate the value of virtual currency that “floats”. This is a
strong reason that regulators should require virtual currency to be
established upon some base value. If an exchange loses those Coins, the
value can be easily calculated by determining the value of the base reserve
that the Coins were created with at the time of the loss. Reserve capital
requirements for exchanges can be easily calculated by state law: If virtual
currency can easily be exchanged for cash by the exchange firm, it needs
only to keep enough Coins in its own possession to satisfy existing state
money transmission laws. These Coins must be held in offline wallets, safe
from theft and “runs” by customers. End users who lose virtual currency
held on their own would still be at a loss, however, but this will simply
encourage them to save their virtual currency in secure exchanges.
Net worth, capital, and permissible investment requirements are among
the most important consumer protection requirements we can put in place
as regulators. Exchanges and other virtual currency firms that have frozen
redemptions for extended periods of time damage to consumer confidence.
The long-term strength of the virtual currency industry will require robust
safety and soundness requirements – so customers have faith that their
money won’t get caught in a virtual black hole. These requirements can be
met when exchanges are required to register as money transmission
services, and undergo such safety and soundness requirements that this
entails. The Silicon Valley company is handling this by becoming
registered in each state as a certified money transmitter, which includes
minimum amounts to be held. This new model of virtual business will need
to be well-funded and will likely be regarded with suspicion by established
banks for some time. This will lead to private arrangements dictated by the
banks that do business with exchanges, on terms the banks set. Without
burdensome restrictions, banks will likely dictate fairly robust soundness
requirements on the exchanges that will become mainstream.
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2. Should Exchanges Be Allowed to Invest on Virtual Currency
Should virtual currencies themselves be allowed as permissible
investments? The maturing nature of virtual currency indicates that Bitcoins
can be treated like investments more easily than as currency. For tax
purposes, Bitcoins are treated as investment income. Purchasers and sellers
who use Bitcoins are cash are relatively safe from the rise and fall of the
market, and those who use future virtual currency should be aware that their
value will be based on their ready-exchange rate into cash or traditional
commodities. But institutional investors and those who seek to earn income
with Bitcoin purchasers should not be regulated any more stringently than
individual consumers. 190
New York State regulators would like to make New York and the United
States a magnet for legitimate, well-regarded exchanges and other virtual
currency firms. They have already begun scrutinizing Bitcoin firms
operating within their jurisdiction. 191 It should begin by mandating that all
virtual currency bought and sold by institutions in the state be backed by
some stable value. GodloveCoins and other virtual currency created with
encrypted account codes that may be called upon at a later date, should be
the only permitted medium of exchange in the state that money transmitters
and institutional investors are permitted to use as investment vehicles.
Investors should not be permitted to use virtual currency with no correlation
to a fixed unit of value as speculative ventures; investing in such currencies
is little different from gambling.
The basic soundness of these companies should be guaranteed by their
abiding by current requirements for money transmitters. Regulators should
avoid creating a separate set of requirements for different technologies that
effectuate the same result. If my proposed development takes place, the
safety and soundness of virtual currency will be brought up to a level that is
tolerable and comparable to similar established technologies.
Currently, virtual currencies are at their most vulnerable when they are
available on public offer. The password used by their owner needs only to
be hacked before the Coins can be transferred out of the owner’s possession
without his authorization. Current exchanges that keep a majority of these

190. Marco Santori, IRS Guidance Further Legitimizes Bitcoin and Provides Clarity, but
Demands Unrealistic Reporting, BITCOIN FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2014), https://bitcoin
foundation.org/blog/?p=600.
191. Greg Farrell, N.Y. Subpoenas Bitcoin Firms in Probe on Criminal Risk, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 12, 2013, 1:27 PM CT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-12/n-y-regulatorsubpoenas-firms-over-bitcoin-crime-risks.html.
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Coins out and available on the market and maintain poor accounting
practices violate already-established federal law. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and state banking laws make such poor protection of property
held in trust of another criminally negligent, and possibly federally
felonious. As the market develops, standard practices will develop and
such instances will become rare.
Future development of Coins of a limited duration, meant to be created,
traded, and then cashed in in a relatively short period of time, should also
increase the safety of virtual currency. When coins are automatically kept in
offline holding and brought to online servers only to be used, then cashed
in, the risk of theft will be low enough that the development of novel laws
governing their safety would be counterproductive and duplicative.
D. The Use of Public Ledgers and Tumblers in Regulation
Law enforcement officials cite the importance of the public ledgers for
Bitcoin and other types of crypto-currencies. It is conceivable that some
virtual currencies could be created without the existence of a public ledger,
but right now no cryptographically secure currencies exist or can be
envisioned. Virtual currencies without an existing public ledger are simply
single-point money transmission devises, similar in most ways to creditcard payment systems, and do not qualify as true virtual currency.
Regulators need to require that newly created virtual currencies use public
ledgers, both for definitional and public interest reasons. Currencies moving
forward need to contain public ledgers, and these ledgers, as discussed
above, can prove very helpful to law enforcement. These ledgers can
accurately record essentially every single transaction that has occurred in a
specific virtual currency since it came in the being. By seeing every
transaction, law enforcement can institute a series of red flags for further
investigation, similar to current banking laws that require disclosures of
unusual transactions or large deposits. Banks and exchange firms must be
regulated in the same manner, and through value-backed virtual securities,
they can be held to relatively simple-to-follow standards for determining
when large deposits or unusual exchanges have been made through them.
Individual users and peer-to-peer transactions will be exempt, of course, but
banks will be obligated to disclose unusual transactions when the
GodloveCoins are redeemed, if the “cash out” terminating the Coins are
unusual. This will satisfy law enforcement and still maintain the flexible
spending of virtual currencies.
Appropriate know-your-customer requirements for virtual currency
firms – public ledgers can help mitigate some of the documented concerns
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related to money laundering and this new technology. Creators of Coins
will be required to provide documentation to banks or other institutions on
which they create the Coins, and users of exchanges will also need to
provide accurate names and addresses, which will severely restrict the use
of virtual currency in illicit markets while still maintaining the efficiency,
secrecy and openness that day-to-day users crave.
A framework of institutions who cater to and facilitate the creation,
transmission, and termination of virtual currency would obviate many of
the associated questions about so-called “tumblers,” which are of particular
concern to law enforcement. Tumblers are a technology used to obscure the
record and source of virtual currency transactions. By obscuring the public
ledger, tumblers disguise the users within a block-chain, and could be used
by criminal enterprises in the middle of a block-chain to launder money.
This is less of a concern for Coins built to facilitate specific purchases and
based upon a stable medium of cash because they have a designated bank or
commodity at the terminal point.
Conclusion
This article has laid out the basic foundation of virtual currency. It
paradoxically holds great promise for ease and safety in facilitating large
international purchases, while the concept in its current nascent form is a
useless and criminally mismanaged enterprise that has been flooded with
the dishonest and foolish. However, it has become a viable and stabilized
tool for transmission of money pseudo-anonymously over the Internet, and
state and federal governments must respond. I have laid out the few simple
laws that must be passed in order to bring virtual currency in line with other
forms of standard currency transmission, and how such laws will eliminate
many of the negative aspects of virtual currency while permitting their
continued development and use. Future articles should respond to various
government agencies’ floundering first steps in this realm.

